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Why does the Fourth Amendment distinctly refer to “papers” prior to
“effects”? Why should we care?
The inquiry is interesting for the usual reasons legal history is
interesting—those who look may find a compelling story that provides the
surest foundation for understanding modern doctrine. In this case, however,
there is an additional and urgent reason for caring about history. Modern
doctrine is in deep trouble and needs all the help it can get.
For more than a century, the Supreme Court adhered to the doctrine of
Boyd v. United States, granting private papers an extraordinary exemption
from seizure, even under warrant.1 Then, during the last quarter of the
twentieth century, the Supreme Court began effectively to equate “papers”
and “effects.”2 Another line of modern cases established “bright-line
1
See infra text accompanying notes 257–266 (discussing Boyd v. United States, 116
U.S. 616 (1886)).
2
United States v. Doe, 465 U.S. 605, 611–12 (1984) (holding that compelled production
of preexisting documents did not violate Fifth Amendment privilege, excepting testimonial
character of the act of production); Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547, 560 (1978)
(holding that search of newspaper office for photographs, under warrant, did not violate
Fourth Amendment); Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463, 477 (1976) (holding that search
of law office, and seizure of documents incriminating suspect in fraud, under warrant, did
not violate the Fourth Amendment); Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 401 (1976)
(holding that compelled production by accountant of client’s documents entrusted to
accountants did not violate Fifth Amendment).
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rules”3 that gave the same constitutional treatment to all “effects.”4
Twenty-first century technology makes these doctrines problematic.
Portable devices like cell phones and flash drives are “effects” subject to
search and seizure like briefcases and backpacks. Given the enormous
quantity and sensitive content of the information digital devices hold,
equating them with other “effects” has troubled courts and commentators.5
In computer search cases, the police may have probable cause and be
able to describe particularly what they are seeking. But the disturbing
feature is the volume of innocent and intimate information that must be
exposed before the criminal material is discovered. This pooling of small
quantities of criminal evidence with large quantities of innocent and
intimate information is not new. It appeared in a great controversy over
general warrants, libels, and seizure of papers that erupted in England in the
1760s.
This Article argues that the history of seizing “papers” explains why
the Amendment uses the term and offers the opportunity to ground special
Fourth Amendment rules for digital evidence. For originalist judges the
pertinence of history is obvious. History is important, however, for any
theory of constitutional interpretation more formal than brazen realism. 6 In
this instance, history might help to reconcile Fourth Amendment doctrine
3
For application of the usual arguments about rules versus standards to the Fourth
Amendment context, see, e.g., Albert W. Alschuler, Bright Line Fever and the Fourth
Amendment, 45 U. PITT. L. REV. 227 (1984) (arguing that Fourth Amendment cases are so
various that rules are arbitrary and defending particularized rulings in the style of parables);
Wayne R. LaFave, “Case-by-Case Adjudication” Versus “Standardized Procedures”: The
Robinson Dilemma, 1974 SUP. CT. REV. 127 (arguing for bright-line rules to govern
recurring patterns of police behavior such as searches incident to arrest).
4
See California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 576 (1991) (holding that warrantless search
of a container in the trunk of a vehicle where police officers had probable cause to believe
that only the container, not the rest of the car, contained contraband, did not violate the
Fourth Amendment); United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 820–21, 825 (1982) (holding that
the vehicle exception to the warrant requirement permits a warrantless search of any
container in the vehicle that could contain the suspected evidence or contraband); New York
v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 460 (1981) (holding that search-incident-to-arrest power permits a
warrantless search of the entire passenger compartment, including containers, of vehicle
occupied by arrested suspect); Gustafson v. Florida, 414 U.S. 260, 266 (1973) (holding that
search-incident power extends to all effects on the person of an arrested suspect, including
containers); United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 235 (1973) (same).
5
See infra Part I.
6
Even for pragmatists and common law constitutionalists, text and history matter—a lot.
Cf. ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 235 (1962) (observing that
text, history, and precedent “are not irrelevant materials, not ever. They are empirical aids,
being deposits of experience; they are sources of inspiration, instigators of reflection,
producers of mood. In short, they are the setting for judgment and they condition it, but they
are not its wellspring”).
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with the widespread sense that some effects are categorically more private
than others.
The Fourth Amendment refers to “papers” because the Founders
understood the seizure of papers to be an outrageous abuse distinct from
general warrants. The English courts and resolutions of the House of
Commons condemned both abuses distinctly. The controversy was closely
followed in America, where colonial Whigs sympathized with, and even
idolized, John Wilkes, who successfully sued for damages for the seizure of
his papers. America inherited the common law ban on searches for papers,
adopted constitutional provisions that mentioned papers distinctly, and
refused to modify the common law ban by statute until the Civil War. The
one Founding-era attempt to authorize seizing papers by statute was
condemned as contrary to common law and natural right and never passed
into law. Although Congress authorized seizing papers to enforce the
revenue laws during the Civil War, it took until the 1880s for a challenge to
reach the Supreme Court. That challenge was Boyd, which remained the
law for another ninety years.
Boyd rightly held that “papers” deserve more constitutional protection
than “effects.” Special protection does not, however, ineluctably mean
absolute immunity. The seizures that aroused outrage in the 1760s were
indiscriminate, expropriating, unregulated, and inquisitorial. A regulated,
discriminate, and nonrivalrous process for inspecting documents is
different.
Indeed, the prohibition on seizing papers was never absolute. Stolen
and contraband papers could be seized under warrant, and perhaps papers of
only evidentiary value could be seized incident to arrest. Moreover, if the
Fourth Amendment, as Story said, is “little more than the affirmance of a
great constitutional doctrine of the common law,”7 the Amendment
incorporates by reference “a great constitutional doctrine” that was dynamic
on its own terms, subject to judicial evolution and statutory modification.8
The supposed choice between no special protection for private papers and
complete immunity for private papers is a false dilemma.
This Article takes no position on the precise special doctrines that
should be formulated to prevent promiscuous searches of digitized
7

3 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 1895,
at 748 (Boston, Hilliard, Gray & Co. 1833).
8
See Donald A. Dripps, Responding to the Challenges of Contextual Change and Legal
Dynamism in Interpreting the Fourth Amendment, 81 MISS. L.J. 1085, 1121 (2012) (arguing
that the Supreme Court should overrule pre-Founding English precedents incorporated by
reference into the Fourth Amendment according to the same criteria that govern overruling
post-ratification Fourth Amendment precedents).
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information. Those depend on costs and benefits, and on institutional
competence to assess costs and benefits.9 The Article claims only that
courts interpreting the Fourth Amendment have legitimate textual and
historical grounds for treating “papers” and their modern counterparts with
more respect than other “effects.”
Part I briefly describes the technological crisis in current Fourth
Amendment doctrine. Part II reviews the history of the controversy over
general warrants, libels, and the seizure of papers that raged in England
early in the reign of George III. Part III turns to the American experience,
beginning with American awareness of the English controversy before
considering the post-Independence reception of the ban on seizing papers,
the adoption of constitutional provisions referring specially to “papers,” and
Founding-era practices. Part IV tells the still largely unsuspected story of
Boyd v. United States. Part V weighs the accumulated evidence and
suggests that Boyd’s inflexible ban on seizing private papers, while more
defensible than modern doctrine’s excision of a word from the
constitutional text, was not the only legitimate doctrinal way to honor the
constitutional preference for “papers” over “effects.” Once we understand
the special evils the Founders saw in seizing papers, we may conclude that
searches carefully structured to minimize those evils are not
“unreasonable.”
I. THE TECHNOLOGICAL CRISIS IN MODERN DOCTRINE
The Supreme Court’s case law permits the search for and seizure of
evidence, including documentary evidence, (a) by warrants meeting the
criteria of the Warrant Clause; (b) without warrants when the police have
probable cause to believe evidence or contraband may be inside a vehicle; 10
and (c) incident to a lawful arrest based on probable cause, even without
particularized suspicion to believe the suspect might destroy evidence or
reach for a weapon.11 When an arrest takes place in public, the police may
thoroughly search the suspect’s person, including personal items such as
wallets and notebooks, and may open containers such as briefcases and
backpacks.12 When the arrest takes place indoors, the police, under Chimel
v. California, may also search areas within the immediate “grabbing range”
9

See Orin S. Kerr, The Fourth Amendment and New Technologies: Constitutional Myths
and the Case for Caution, 102 MICH. L. REV. 801, 857 (2004) (arguing against judicial, as
opposed to legislative, regulation); Stephen Rushin, The Judicial Response to Mass Police
Surveillance, 2011 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 281, 322–27 (arguing for judicial regulation).
10
Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
11
See 3 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT § 5.2 (4th ed. 2004).
12
See id.
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of the suspect.13 When the arrest takes place in a vehicle, the recent
decision in Arizona v. Gant directs that police “may search a vehicle
incident to a recent occupant’s arrest only if the arrestee is within reaching
distance of the passenger compartment at the time of the search or it is
reasonable to believe the vehicle contains evidence of the offense of
arrest.”14
As Orin Kerr forcefully pointed out, these physical-evidence rules are
incongruous when applied to digital evidence.15 The physical-evidence
rules permit the police to carry off the suspect’s computer drives and peruse
every file if they have probable cause to believe such a search will yield a
single incriminating file. And when the suspect is arrested while carrying a
cell phone or thumb drive, a literal application of the predigital searchincident-to-arrest rules permits the police to read every contact and file
without probable cause.
A warrant to search the garage of a suspect’s home for a stolen pickup
truck does not authorize the police to search the garage of another home
owned by the same suspect. That would be a general warrant, which is
anathema to the Constitution. Yet while one warrant will not permit law
enforcement to search two premises for physical evidence, one warrant will
suffice to read all the files on a personal computer, so long as it particularly
describes the incriminating files to be seized. Yet the intrusion on privacy
from opening the door of the second unit’s garage seems dramatically less
than that attending the search, file by file, of the family desktop. Current
doctrine has gone badly awry in the digital-evidence context.
A. SEARCHES FOR DIGITAL EVIDENCE PURSUANT TO WARRANT
OR THE VEHICLE EXCEPTION TO THE WARRANT
REQUIREMENT
Once law enforcement agents have built a record of probable cause to
suspect that incriminating files are present on a suspect’s computer, the
standard practice is to obtain a warrant to enter the suspect’s premises and
remove digital storage devices for subsequent search at police
headquarters.16 The practice extends beyond the investigation of crimes
committed by digital communications. Given probable cause to suspect
13

See id. § 6.3(b).
Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 343 (2009) (footnote omitted); see 3 LAFAVE, supra
note 11, § 7.1(c).
15
See Orin S. Kerr, Digital Evidence and the New Criminal Procedure, 105 COLUM. L.
REV. 279 (2005).
16
See id. at 288.
14
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that a target committed an offense, general information that similar
offenders sometimes document crimes on their technology can support a
search warrant.
For example, in United States v. Burgess, police lawfully stopped the
suspect’s motor home on the road for the ostensible purpose of traffic
enforcement.17 During the stop a drug-sniffing dog alerted to the vehicle,
establishing probable cause to search the mobile home for drugs.18 The
police found marijuana in the mobile home, arrested Burgess, and
impounded the vehicle.19 Inside the vehicle the police also found a laptop
computer and two hard drives.20
The police then sought a warrant, representing that drug dealers often
keep “trophy photos” of large quantities of drugs or cash to celebrate
successful transactions.21 The judge issued a warrant to search the motor
home for “evidence to show the transportation and delivery of controlled
substances,” including “computer records” and “pay-owe sheets, address
books, rolodexes, pagers, firearms and monies.”22 The warrant imposed no
special limits on the computer searches.
An investigator copied all three drives using a program that permitted
the officer to view the files as they were copied.23 The officer saw an image
of “child sexual exploitation,” turned off the view function, and sought
another warrant authorizing a search of the drives for child pornography. 24
That warrant was issued and the police subsequently found thousands of
child-pornographic images.25
Burgess moved to suppress, arguing that the initial warrant was
general and so the plain-view discovery of the child pornography was fruit
of the poisonous tree.26 The government defended the warrant as
adequately particularized and also claimed that, even if the warrant were
void, the police could search the computer drives under the vehicle
exception because the drives were analogous to containers that had been
found in a vehicle.27 The district court accepted both government
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27

United States v. Burgess, 576 F.3d 1078, 1082 (10th Cir. 2009).
Id.
Id. at 1083.
Id.
Id. at 1083–84.
Id. at 1083.
Id. at 1084.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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arguments.28 On appeal the Tenth Circuit upheld the initial warrant and
declined to rule on the defendant’s argument that the vehicle search
exception should not extend to digital evidence.29
By its literal terms the warrant authorized the police to search all the
suspect’s computer files for anything at all.30 The supporting affidavit
indicated that the police were looking for photographic evidence of drug
dealing, although the warrant did not say this.31 The Burgess court rescued
the warrant by imputing the affidavit’s mention of “trophy photos” to the
warrant.32 On the authority of this generic warrant, even as narrowed by
construction, the police undertook the process of copying and viewing all
the files on the three drives.33
The court’s evasive passage rejecting the defendant’s particularity
argument betrayed considerable ambivalence: While “[o]fficers must be
clear as to what it is they are seeking on the computer and conduct the
search in a way that avoids searching files of types not identified in the
warrant,”34 “a computer search may be as extensive as reasonably required
to locate the items described in the warrant”35 based on probable cause.
And “[t]his Court has never required warrants to contain a particularized
computer search strategy.”36 Recognizing with regret the global search
power conferred on police by a warrant authorizing a search of computer
files, the Tenth Circuit weighed the evils and concluded that “it is folly for a
search warrant to attempt to structure the mechanics of the search and a
warrant imposing such limits would unduly restrict legitimate search
objectives.”37 “[I]n the end, there may be no practical substitute for actually
looking in many (perhaps all) folders and sometimes at the documents
28

Id.
Id. at 1090 (“In spite of clear language in Acevedo, one might speculate whether the
Supreme Court would treat laptop computers, hard drives, flash drives or even cell phones as
it has a briefcase or give those types of devices preferred status because of their unique
ability to hold vast amounts of diverse personal information. Interesting as the issue may be,
we need not now resolve it because the search of Burgess’ hard drives was authorized by a
warrant.”).
30
Id. at 1094.
31
Id. at 1091–92.
32
Id. at 1091 (citation omitted).
33
Id. at 1091–92.
34
Id. at 1092 (quoting United States v. Walser, 275 F.3d 981, 986 (10th Cir. 2001)).
35
Id. (quoting United States v. Grimmett, 439 F.3d 1263, 1270 (10th Cir. 2006)).
36
Id. (quoting United States v. Brooks, 427 F.3d 1246, 1251 (10th Cir. 2005) (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
37
Id. at 1094.
29
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contained within those folders, and that is true whether the search is of
computer files or physical files. It is particularly true with image files.”38
The Ninth Circuit has weighed the evils rather differently. In United
States v. Comprehensive Drug Testing, the en banc court’s opinion upheld
two lower court rulings ordering the government to return computer records
seized in violation of warrants that did impose limits on the search of
computer files.39 Neither Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 41 nor any
Supreme Court case interpreting the Fourth Amendment requires special
procedures for computer searches.40 The issue was whether, where district
courts included safeguards in the search warrants, plaintiffs were entitled to
the return of their records when the government failed to abide by the terms
of the warrants.41
The court’s per curiam opinion did not expressly say that a warrant
that failed to include special particularity guarantees, like the one in
Burgess, would be unconstitutional, but that message was at least arguably
implied. Chief Judge Kozinski, joined by four other judges, went further in
a concurring opinion. In the interests of guiding lower courts, prosecutors,
and agents, the concurring opinion described a constitutional “safe harbor”
for warrants to search computer files. The (rather strongly) suggested
warrant structure is as follows:
1. Magistrate judges should insist that the government waive reliance upon the plain
view doctrine in digital evidence cases.
2. Segregation and redaction of electronic data must be done either by specialized
personnel or an independent third party. If the segregation is to be done by
government computer personnel, the government must agree in the warrant
application that the computer personnel will not disclose to the investigators any
information other than that which is the target of the warrant.
3. Warrants and subpoenas must disclose the actual risks of destruction of information
as well as prior efforts to seize that information in other judicial fora.
4. The government’s search protocol must be designed to uncover only the
information for which it has probable cause, and only that information may be
examined by the case agents.

38

Id. If image files are not Fourth Amendment “papers,” a point on which I here express
no view, they would just be “effects” and the Burgess holding would be unproblematic from
a historical perspective.
39
621 F.3d 1162, 1167–75 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc) (per curiam).
40
The majority and the concurrence rely on dicta in United States v. Tamura, 694 F.2d
591 (9th Cir. 1982), directing magistrates to regulate and monitor large-scale seizures of
paper documents.
41
Comprehensive Drug Testing, 621 F.3d at 1165–66.
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5. The government must destroy or, if the recipient may lawfully possess it, return
non-responsive data, keeping the issuing magistrate informed about when it has done
42
so and what it has kept.

The suggested approach is structurally similar to the special rules for digital
searches adopted in the United Kingdom.43
Chief Judge Kozinski supported the recommended guidelines by
citations suggesting they were implicit in the majority opinion. Judge Bea,
however, characterized Judge Kozinksi’s opinion as “advisory,”44 while
Judge Callahan, joined by Judge Ikuta, agreed that the concurrence was
advisory but also criticized the suggested guidelines.45 Judge Callahan
made the forceful points that the concurrence would effectively eliminate
42

Id. at 1180 (Kozinski, C.J., concurring) (citations omitted).
The Police and Criminal Evidence Act (PACE), 1984, c. 60 § 8 (U.K.), abrogated the
common law prohibition of warrants for papers insofar as PACE authorizes warrants to enter
private premises to search for “material” that may be evidence or have substantial value in
the investigation. POLICE AND CRIMINAL EVIDENCE ACT 1984 CODE B: CODE OF PRACTICE
FOR SEARCHES OF PREMISES BY POLICE OFFICERS AND THE SEIZURE OF PROPERTY FOUND BY
POLICE OFFICERS ON PERSONS OR PREMISES, § 7.1 (2010), available at
http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/publications/police/operational-policing/pace-codes/pacecode-b-2011?view=Binary. PACE provides that:
43

Subject to paragraph 7.2, an officer who is searching any person or premises under any statutory
power or with the consent of the occupier may seize anything:
(a) covered by a warrant
(b) the officer has reasonable grounds for believing is evidence of an offence or has been
obtained in consequence of the commission of an offence but only if seizure is necessary
to prevent the items being concealed, lost, disposed of, altered, damaged, destroyed or
tampered with
(c) covered by the powers in the Criminal Justice and Police Act 2001, Part 2 allowing an
officer to seize property from persons or premises and retain it for sifting or examination
elsewhere.

Id.
Code B’s §§ 7.5–7.7 caution that police may seize documents or computer files only
when it is impracticable to rely on printouts or photocopies, and that a resort to the “seize
and sift” provisions of the Criminal Justice and Police Act 2001 is only appropriate if it is
essential and police do not remove any more material than necessary. Id. The removal of
large volumes of material, much of which may not ultimately be retainable, may have
serious implications for the owners, particularly when they are involved in business or
activities such as journalism or the provision of medical services. Id. Officers must
carefully consider if removing copies or images of relevant material or data would be a
satisfactory alternative to removing originals. Id. When originals are taken, officers must be
prepared to facilitate the provision of copies or images for the owners when reasonably
practicable. Id.
44
Comprehensive Drug Testing, 621 F.3d at 1182 (Bea, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
45
Id. at 1183 (Callahan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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the plain-view doctrine in computer searches and that it offered “no legal
authority for its proposal requiring the segregation of computer data by
specialized personnel or an independent third party.”46
In sum, Burgess states the orthodox view of searches of computers and
other electronics, which equates digital storage devices with file cabinets.47
Despite the dominance of rote application of the physical rules to the digital
sphere, there is unquiet among judges. Comprehensive Drug Testing is one
example. The apologetic tone in Burgess, itself retreating from the Tenth
Circuit’s former special regard for digital evidence, is another.
B. SEARCHES OF DIGITAL EVIDENCE INCIDENT TO LAWFUL
ARREST
In United States v. Robinson, the Supreme Court upheld a “thorough”
“search of respondent’s person” because Robinson had been lawfully
arrested.49 No case-specific reason for a search, such as specific grounds to
believe the suspect is carrying weapons or contraband, is required.50 In
Robinson the Court rejected the defendant’s motion to suppress heroin
found inside a crumpled cigarette pack located in Robinson’s pocket. The
lower courts have applied the automatic right to search items found on the
person arrested to such personal items as wallets and purses.51
A cell phone seems very similar to other personal effects. Many
suspects are arrested with their phones literally on their persons, inside a
pocket or a purse. Professor Gershowitz estimates that in recent years
police have made “thousands” of searches of cell phones incident to
arrests.52 The leading case, United States v. Finley,53 simply equated
46

Id. at 1184.
See United States v. Richards, 659 F.3d 527, 538 (6th Cir. 2011) (observing that “the
majority of federal courts have eschewed the use of a specific search protocol and, instead,
have employed the Fourth Amendment’s bedrock principle of reasonableness on a case-bycase basis”) (footnote omitted); Thomas K. Clancy, The Fourth Amendment Aspects of
Computer Searches and Seizures: A Perspective and a Primer, 75 MISS. L.J. 193, 197–202
(2005). Indeed, as Clancy points out, the then-leading case recommending special
computer-search protocols was the Tenth Circuit decision in United States v. Carey, 172
F.3d 1268 (10th Cir. 1999), which Burgess distinguished as “fact intense.” United States v.
Burgess, 576 F.3d 1078, 1092 (10th Cir. 2009).
49
414 U.S. 218, 236 (1973).
50
Id. at 235 (holding “that in the case of a lawful custodial arrest a full search of the
person is not only an exception to the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment, but is
also a ‘reasonable’ search under that Amendment”).
51
3 LAFAVE, supra note 11, § 5.3; see, e.g., United States v. Rodriguez, 995 F.2d 776,
778 (7th Cir. 1993) (upholding search of wallet and address book); People v. Harris, 164
Cal. Rptr. 296, 301–03 (Ct. App. 1980) (upholding search of purse and wallet found therein).
52
Adam M. Gershowitz, Can Police Search Your Cell Phone, and Even Break Your
47
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Finley’s cell phone with Robinson’s cigarette pack.54 Yet in Finley the
agents read the address book and text messages stored in Finley’s phone,55
an intrusion that seems dramatically more intrusive than rummaging
through a cigarette pack.
Although Finley is still generally followed,56 some judicial skepticism
is emerging. In State v. Smith, the police seized Smith’s cell phone from his
person at the time of arrest and later searched the address book and text
messages.57 The Ohio Supreme Court rejected the analogy to “containers,”
reasoning that a container is one object capable of holding another object.58
Repositories of intangible information, like Smith’s phone, were different.59
The Smith court then concluded that Smith had a higher expectation of
privacy in his phone than in ordinary effects, and that while the warrantless
seizure of the phone at the time of arrest was reasonable, the subsequent
warrantless search of its contents was not.60
Eventually the Supreme Court will decide cases in which the
government relied on traditional, rolodex-era warrants to search computer
records, and defense counsel argue that digital searches without novel
safeguards along the lines suggested by Chief Judge Kozinski are
“unreasonable.” Likewise the high Court is likely to decide cases in which
the government relies on the search-incident-to-arrest exception to justify
searches of cell phones, tablets, flash drives, and notebook computers
without warrants or probable cause. The Court’s own cases regarding
physical evidence are relatively recent but disturbingly incongruent with the
lived experience of modern technology.
Password, During an Arrest?, 35 CHAMPION 16, 17 (2011) (“Although it is impossible to
know how many cell phone searches have been conducted incident to arrest over the last few
years, the number is likely in the thousands.”) (footnote omitted).
53
United States v. Finley, 477 F.3d 250 (5th Cir. 2007).
54
See id. at 259–60 (“Police officers are not constrained to search only for weapons or
instruments of escape on the arrestee’s person; they may also, without any additional
justification, look for evidence of the arrestee’s crime on his person in order to preserve it for
use at trial.”) (citing Robinson, 414 U.S. at 233–34).
55
Finley, 477 F.3d at 254.
56
See 3 LAFAVE, supra note 11, § 5.2 (observing that “on the limited occasions when the
issue has been reached, courts have also rather consistently found ‘warrantless searches of
cell phones to fall squarely within the search-incident-to-arrest exception,’ so that call
records and text messages found in such a search are thereby admissible in evidence”)
(footnote omitted).
57
920 N.E.2d 949, 950 (Ohio 2011).
58
Id. at 953–54.
59
Id. at 955.
60
Id.
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When these cases arise, will the Court be able to find some principled
ground for recognizing the special privacy concerns raised by dense
concentrations of highly personal information found in common handheld
devices? History suggests that certain “effects”—private “papers”—were
indeed originally understood to deserve more constitutional protection than
others. If that is so, and if a cogent analogy can be drawn between
eighteenth-century “papers” and modern digital storage devices, there may
be neglected doctrinal opportunities for responding to the technology crisis
in Fourth Amendment law.
So let us go to the past and, just perhaps, back to the future.
II. THE CONTROVERSY OVER LIBELS, GENERAL WARRANTS, AND THE
SEIZURE OF PAPERS, 1763–1766
The Fourth Amendment is generally seen as a response to two protests
against particular abuses, the first against Writs of Assistance in the
colonies in 1761–1762 and the second against general warrants in England
in 1764–1765. The inspiration for singling out “papers” in the Fourth
Amendment lies in this later controversy. John Adams’s report of Otis’s
famous argument against the Writs of Assistance makes no special mention
of papers.61 This is not surprising because the writs did not authorize
seizure of papers, only of undutied goods.62 The English courts had not yet
prohibited general warrants to search for and seize libels.
But in 1762 and 1763, the King’s messengers executed general
warrants to seize the authors and printers of seditious libels. They were
sued successfully in the courts, which distinctly condemned general
warrants and warrants for papers. Leading Whig commentators and
resolutions of the House of Commons condemned the distinct but related
evils of general warrants and warrants for papers. American Patriots paid
close attention to this political drama.
A. THE NORTH BRITON NO. 45
George III became King of England in 1760. His chief minister was a
Scot, the Earl of Bute. It was an age of weekly “newspapers” (pamphlets,
really), exemplified by such items as The Tattler and The Rambler.
Supporters of the government—the Tories—ran a paper called The Briton.
61

See JOHN ADAMS, THE WORKS OF JOHN ADAMS 519–20 (1865). Otis lost his case, see,
e.g., M.H. SMITH, THE WRITS OF ASSISTANCE CASE 391–92 (1978), but Otis’s argument
inspired Adams and, presumably, others. Very few writs were ever actually issued by
colonial courts.
62
See, e.g., WILLIAM MACDONALD, DOCUMENTARY SOURCE BOOK OF AMERICAN
HISTORY 1606–1898, at 108 (1908) (“THEREFORE we strictly Injoin & Command you . . .
to inspect & oversee & search for the said goods wares & merchandize.”).
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John Wilkes, a flamboyant Member of Parliament and a leading Whig,
published a weekly paper called the North Briton. The North Briton’s title
was itself a dig at Bute’s Scottish roots, but Wilkes went further—much
further—in the famous issue No. 45.
In popular parlance, “the 45” referred to the last major revolt by
supporters of the exiled House of Stuart (called “Jacobites” because James
Francis Edward Stuart was then the heir to that house). The 1745 uprising
involved a plan to join Jacobite forces from the continent with allies in
Scotland. Wilkes was linking, with no great subtlety, the King’s favorite
minister with those who had plotted to restore the Stuart monarchy, widely
unpopular on account of its political oppressiveness and its Catholic
sympathies.
No. 45 was a scurrilous attack on the King’s speech opening the latest
session of Parliament, a speech defending the Treaty of Paris, which ended
the Seven Years’ War. Wilkes took the line that the British had won the
war but lost the conference, the whole of Canada being regarded as
insufficient booty. The shots at Bute came very close to the King: “In vain
will such a minister, or the foul dregs of his power, the tools of corruption
and despotism, preach up in the speech that spirit of concord, and that
obedience to the laws, which is essential to good order.”63 His Majesty was
incensed and Lord Halifax, the Secretary of State, wrote out a general
warrant to “seize and arrest” everyone connected with No. 45 “together
with their papers” (the Halifax warrant).64 Wilkes was arrested on April 30,
1763, and all his papers carried off;65 forty-nine others were arrested.66
His supporters having sued out a writ of habeas corpus, Wilkes was
brought to the bar of the Court of Common Pleas on May 3. In the speech
he is said to have given there, Wilkes remarked on his injuries and vowed

63

JOHN WILKES, THE NORTH BRITON, NO. 45, Apr. 23, 1763, reprinted in JOHN WILKES
AN AUTHENTICK ACCOUNT OF THE PROCEEDINGS AGAINST JOHN WILKES 8, 10 (1763)
[hereinafter AUTHENTICK ACCOUNT].
64
The warrant, “directed to” Nathan Carrington, John Money, James Watson, and Robert
Blackmore, “Four of his majesty’s messengers in ordinary” states:
THESE are in his Majesty’s Name to authorize and require you (taking a Constable to your
assistance) to make strict and diligent search for the Authors, Printers, and Publishers of a
seditious and treasonable Paper, intitled, The North Briton, Number XLV . . . and them or any of
them having found to apprehend and seize together with their papers and to bring in safe custody
before me to be examined concerning the premises and further dealt with according to law[.]

AUTHENTICK ACCOUNT, supra note 63, at 12–13.
65
Id. at 13.
66
See, e.g., WILLIAM J. CUDDIHY, THE FOURTH AMENDMENT: ORIGINS
MEANING 602–1791, at 440 (2009).
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revenge in the courts:
The particular cruelties of my treatment, worse than if I had been a Scots Rebel, this
court will hear, and I dare say, from your justice, in due time redress. . . . My papers
have been seized, perhaps with a hope the better to deprive me of that proof of their
meanness, and corrupt prodigality, which it may possibly, in a proper place, be yet in
67
my power to give.

Chief Justice Pratt of the Court of Common Pleas (later Lord Camden)
ordered Wilkes released because libel was not a breach of the peace and
therefore Wilkes, as a member of Parliament, was privileged against
arrest.68
B. GENERAL WARRANTS AND THE SEIZURE OF PAPERS: THE
HOUSE OF COMMONS TEMPORIZES
Wilkes, after recovering from a wound suffered in a duel, then fled to
France and was expelled from the Commons on January 19, 1764.69 On
February 14, his supporters introduced a resolution: “That a General
Warrant for apprehending and seizing the authors, printers, and publishers
of a seditious libel, together with their papers, is not warranted by law.”70 A
variety of amendments, apparently intended to garner as many votes as
possible, resulted in this wording:
That a General Warrant for apprehending and seizing the authors, printers, and
publishers, of a seditious and treasonable libel, together with their papers, is not
warranted by law; although such warrant hath been issued according to the usage of
office; and hath been frequently produced to, and, so far as appears to this House, the
validity thereof hath never been debated in the court of King’s-bench; but the parties
71
thereupon have been frequently bailed by the said court.

There was intense debate on the measure, and many supporters of the
government (now led by Grenville rather than Bute) were in favor of the
motion. Confronted with his own practice of issuing general warrants when
he served as prime minister, the Whig William Pitt (the elder) claimed to
have issued them, knowing them to be illegal, as an act of selfless
disobedience in wartime emergency.72 The house narrowly voted (232 to
67

AUTHENTICK ACCOUNT, supra note 63, at 19.
Id. at 25.
69
See 15 THE PARLIAMENTARY HISTORY OF ENGLAND FROM THE EARLIEST PERIOD TO THE
YEAR 1803, at 1393–94 (London, T.C. Hansard 1813) [hereinafter PARLIAMENTARY
HISTORY]. Expulsion followed the disclosure of Wilkes’s coauthorship of An Essay on
Woman, an obscene parody of Pope’s Essay on Man. See, e.g., JOHN STEVEN WATSON &
JOHN CLARK, THE REIGN OF GEORGE III, 1760–1815, at 101 (1960).
70
15 PARLIAMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 69, at 1399.
71
Id. at 1401.
72
See, e.g., 5 LORD MAHON, HISTORY OF ENGLAND FROM THE PEACE OF UTRECHT TO THE
PEACE OF VERSAILLES 153–54 (1853).
68

64

DONALD A. DRIPPS

[Vol. 103

218) to put off debate on the resolution for four months.73
C. THE TORT SUITS AGAINST THE KING’S MESSENGERS AND
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
Meanwhile Wilkes and others molested on the authority of the Halifax
warrant were pressing tort suits against the executing officers and Halifax
himself.74 In December 1863, Pratt upheld a jury verdict for Wilkes against
Wood, one of the officers who executed the Halifax warrant, holding the
warrant illegal and void.75 Pratt refused to receive Wood’s bill of
exceptions as untimely, but when the King’s Bench heard the issue in
Money v. Leach, all the judges opined that the Halifax warrant was illegal
and void.76
One of Wilkes’s associates was John Entick, the author of another
antigovernment periodical, The Monitor, or British Freeholder. In
November 1762, before the appearance of the fateful North Briton No. 45,
Entick’s house was raided by officers executing another warrant issued by
Halifax. Encouraged by the success Wilkes and others were enjoying in the
courts, Entick sued Nathan Carrington and the other officers who had
ransacked his home.
The defendants pleaded two justifications for the alleged trespass.
First, they claimed that Halifax had the status, and therefore the immunity,
of a justice of the peace. That immunity, they argued, should extend to the
officers. Second, they claimed that the warrant made forcible entry of
private premises legal. The defendants’ pleadings described the warrant as
follows:
[T]he earl did in the King’s name authorize and require the defendants, taking a
constable to their assistance, to make strict and diligent search for the plaintiff,
mentioned in the said warrant to be the author, or one concerned in the writing of
several weekly very seditious papers, intitled, The Monitor or British Freeholder, No.
357, 358, 360, 373, 376, and 380, London, printed for J. Wilson and J. Fell in
Paternoster Row, containing gross and scandalous reflections and invectives upon His

73

15 PARLIAMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 69, at 1401.
Together with party sentiment, the pending litigation helps to explain the failure of the
resolution condemning general warrants even though general warrants seemed to have
received no defense in the Commons. See 2 THOMAS ERSKINE MAY, THE CONSTITUTIONAL
HISTORY OF ENGLAND 129 (Francis Holland ed., new ed. 1912).
75
Wilkes v. Wood, (1763) 98 Eng. Rep. 489, 499, 19 How. St. Tr. 1153, 1168 (C.P.).
76
(1765) 97 Eng. Rep. 1075, 1088, 19 How. St. Tr. 1002, 1027 (K.B.). After Lord
Mansfield, Justice Wilmot, Justice Yates, and Justice Aston agreed that the warrant was
illegal, the case was reargued and the verdict upheld because the defendants had not acted in
accordance with the warrant. See 97 Eng. Rep. at 1088–89.
74
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Majesty’s Government, and upon both Houses of Parliament, and him the plaintiff
having found, to seize and apprehend and bring together with his books and papers in
safe custody, before the Earl of Halifax to be examined concerning the premises, and
77
further dealt with according to law . . . .

Pratt’s famous opinion rejected both defenses, finding that the
secretary was not entitled to immunity and that the warrant was illegal and
void.78
There were two published reports of Entick v. Carrington. Serjeant
Wilson’s reports appeared in 1770.79 In 1780, Francis Hargrave published a
new edition of Howell’s State Trials, in ten volumes, followed by a
supplemental eleventh volume in 1781.80 Professor Davies has argued that
the American Founders would only have known Wilson’s report, while
Boyd cites only to the State Trials report.81 Antebellum American
references to Entick typically cite to Wilson’s report rather than Hargrave’s.
There is, however, some evidence indicating that the State Trials edition

77
Entick v. Carrington, (1765) 95 Eng. Rep. 807, 808, 2 Wils. 275, 275–76, 19 How. St.
Tr. 1029 (K.B.).
78
Entick, 19 How. St. Tr. at 1062, 1074.
79
Entick appears in 2 Wils. 275.
80
See JOHN WILLIAM WALLACE, THE REPORTERS 66–67 (Boston, Soule & Bugbee, 4th
rev. ed. 1882). The earliest references to the State Trials version cite “11 St. Tr. 313.” See
Bell v. Clapp, 10 Johns. 263, 265 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1813) (per curiam). Early in the nineteenth
century, William Cobbett brought out a new version of the State Trials in thirty-four
volumes, edited initially by Thomas Bayley Howell and subsequently by his son, Thomas
Jones Howell. See WALLACE, supra, at 67–68. The Cobbett–Howell report is taken from
Hargrave, as it begins with a note by Hargrave about why the text differs from Wilson’s.
Entick, 19 How. St. Tr. at 1029. Hargrave took the arguments of counsel straight from
Wilson, but “instead of his short note of the Judgement [sic] of the Court, the Editor
[Hargrave] has the pleasing satisfaction to present to the reader the Judgment itself at length,
as delivered by the Lord Chief Justice of the Common-Pleas from written notes.” Id.
According to Hargrave, Pratt’s original:

[W]as not deemed worthy of preservation by its author, but was actually committed to the
flames. Fortunately, the Editor remembered to have formerly seen a copy of the Judgment in the
hands of a friend; and upon application to him, it was immediately obtained, with liberty to the
Editor to make use of it at his discretion.

Id. After the appearance of the Cobbett–Howell volumes, the standard citation became “19
How. St. Tr. 1029.”
81
See Thomas Y. Davies, Can You Handle the Truth? The Framers Preserved CommonLaw Criminal Arrest and Search Rules in “Due Process of Law”—“Fourth Amendment
Reasonableness” Is Only a Modern, Destructive, Judicial Myth, 43 TEX. TECH L. REV. 51,
118 (2010) (“[B]ecause it is unlikely that the later report would have been imported in
significant numbers during the remainder of the framing era, it seems highly doubtful
Americans would have become familiar with Camden’s notion that a search warrant for
papers was inherently illegal even by the time of the framing of the Fourth Amendment in
1789.”).
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was circulating in America as well as in England.82
Although Wilson’s report is denser, both reports of Entick identify four
distinct obnoxious features of the warrant to seize papers. First, not only
was it general with respect to the premises to be entered forcibly in search
of the suspected papers, but also it was totally indiscriminate about the
papers to be seized and carried away.83 Second, it expropriated. The
plaintiff’s papers were not merely read by government agents, but the
plaintiff himself was deprived of their use.84 Third, the execution of the
warrant was unregulated. The warrant did not require the presence of the
owner or any neutral witness, an inventory, or a process for disputing the
seizure and recovering the papers.85 Finally, the seizure of papers was
inquisitorial. Unlike the seizure of other goods, the seizure of papers
reveals the private workings of a person’s mind to government agents

82

See Roger Roots, The Originalist Case for the Fourth Amendment Exclusionary Rule,
45 GONZ. L. REV. 1, 41 n.260 (2009–2010) (“Moreover, the set of books containing the
longer version (Hargrave’s A Complete Collection of State-Trials and Proceedings for HighTreason, and Other Crimes and Misdemeanours (known as State Trials, 4th edition
(1781))[)] was a fixture of late-eighteenth-century law libraries. Over a hundred of these
sets survive in the rare book collections of American libraries today, and several libraries
(e.g., Yale’s and Harvard’s) hold more than one complete set. The notion that all of these
book sets, published in 1781, crossed the Atlantic only after the Fourth Amendment was
proposed and ratified (between September 1787 and December 1791) seems highly
unlikely.”).
83
See Entick, 2 Wils. at 291 (comparing Entick to Wilkes, in which “we were told by one
of these messengers that he was obliged by his oath to sweep away all papers whatsoever; if
this is law it would be found in our books, but no such law ever existed in this country”);
Entick, 19 How. St. Tr. at 1064 (“[T]he house must be searched; the lock and doors of every
room, box or trunk must be broken open; all the papers and books without exception . . .
must be seized and carried away . . . .”); id. at 1065 (“Nor is there pretence to say, that the
word ‘papers’ here mentioned ought in point of law to be restrained to the libellous papers
only. The word is general, and there is nothing in the warrant to confine it . . . .”).
84
See Entick, 2 Wils. at 292 (“[T]his is the first instance of an attempt to prove a modern
practice . . . to make and execute warrants to enter a man’s house, search for and take away
all his books and papers in the first instance, to be law, which is not to be found in our
books.”); Entick, 19 How. St. Tr. at 1066 (“[T]he party’s own property is seized before and
without conviction, and he has no power to reclaim his goods, even after his innocence is
cleared by acquittal.”).
85
See Entick, 2 Wils. at 291 (“[I]t was left to the discretion of these defendants to
execute the warrant in the absence or presence of the plaintiff, when he might have no
witness present to see what they did; for they were to seize all papers, bank bills, or any
other valuable papers they might take away if there so disposed; there might be nobody to
detect them . . . .”); Entick, 19 How. St. Tr. at 1065 (“[T]he whole transaction is so guarded
against discovery, that if the offer should be disposed to carry off a bank-bill, he may do it
with impunity, since there is no man capable of proving the taker or the thing taken.”).
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seeking a criminal conviction.86
Professor Sklansky argues that American hostility to the inquisitorial
system in the original understandings of 1791, and especially 1868, has
been exaggerated.87 These points are well-taken and perhaps even
understated; the Framers retained the most inquisitorial English procedure,
examination following arrest.88 Yet the evidence is unequivocal that Whig
jurists condemned the seizure of papers as inquisitorial. For example,
Serjeant Glynn argued in Entick that:
[N]o power can lawfully break into a man’s house and study to search for evidence
against him; this would be worse than the Spanish inquisition; for ransacking a man’s
secret drawers and boxes to come at evidence against him, is like racking his body to
89
come at his secret thoughts.

If the vice in the Halifax warrant in Entick was not the authorization of
seizing papers, what was it? The warrant might not pass modern standards
of Fourth Amendment particularity, but it was far more specific than the
one issued in the Wilkes case.90 Hargrave gave titles to the cases in the
State Trials reports. He called Wilkes v. Wood “the Case of General
Warrants” and Entick v. Carrington “the case of Seizure of Papers.” These
were the names—one might suppose—they already had among lawyers.
Entick’s respect for papers went so far as to question whether libels
themselves could be seized. Pratt admitted that the practice had been to
seize libels, but dated the practice only to an advisory opinion delivered by

86
See Entick, 2 Wils. at 291–92 (upholding the warrant “would destroy all the comforts
of society; for papers are often the dearest property a man can have”); id. at 292 (“The law
never forces evidence from the party in whose power it is; when an adversary has got your
deeds, there is no lawful way of getting them again but by an action. Our law is wise and
merciful, and supposes every man accused to be innocent before he is tried by peers . . . .”)
(internal citation omitted); Entick, 19 How. St. Tr. at 1066 (“Papers are the owner’s goods
and chattels; they are his dearest property; and are so far from enduring a seizure, that they
will hardly bear an inspection; and though the eye cannot by the laws of England be guilty of
a trespass, yet where private papers are removed and carried away, the secret nature of those
goods will be an aggravation of the trespass, and demand more considerable damages in that
respect.”).
87
David Alan Sklansky, Anti-Inquisitorialism, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1634, 1670–77
(2009).
88
See Eben Moglen, Taking the Fifth: Reconsidering the Origins of the Constitutional
Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 92 MICH. L. REV. 1086, 1125 (1994) (describing
persistence of the examination procedure in Founding-era America).
89
2 Wils. at 283; see also infra text accompanying note 110.
90
See Eric Schnapper, Unreasonable Searches and Seizures of Papers, 71 VA. L. REV.
869, 881 (1985) (“[T]he warrant expressly named Entick” and this “distinguished it from the
general warrants at issue in the other decisions. Indeed, not once do either the lengthy
arguments of counsel or the opinions refer to the Entick warrant as a general warrant.”).
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Scroggs.91 If the seizure of libels was lawful, then they were proper objects
of searches and “half the kingdom would be guilty in the case of a favourite
libel, if libels may be searched for and seized by whomsoever and
wheresoever the secretary of state thinks fit.”92 Given the magnitude of the
pool into which the criminal documents were commingled, tolerating libel
might be a lesser evil than tolerating the search powers necessary to ferret
out the libels.
Pratt, however, left the question open, saying “if” private possession of
a libel is crime, “as many cases say,” disturbing search powers follow.93 In
the fuller report he says, “If libels may be seized, it ought to be laid down
with precision, when, where, upon what charge, against whom, by what
magistrate, and in what stage of the prosecution.”94 Although it seems that
libels were contraband that had no legal value,95 I have been unable to find
concrete post-Entick examples of seizing stocks of offending pamphlets. In
1819 Parliament adopted a Libel Act as part of the notorious Six Acts, a
crackdown on radicalism. Section 1 of the Act authorized the seizure of
copies of a libel following the conviction of the author or publisher.96 From
the general purpose of the Six Acts, I suppose the Libel Act broadened prior
seizure powers, but this is only conjecture.
The reported opinions were only one source of public information
about the controversy over the seizure of papers. Before Wilson’s reports
were published in 1770, the parliamentary debate about general warrants in
1764 set off a pamphlet war between Whigs and Tories. There are at least
passing references to the special evil of seizing papers in every Whig tract I
have seen, and a full exposition of the theory later expressed in Boyd,
including the notion that use of papers at trial is compelled selfincrimination, in the most prominent pamphlet of them all.

91

On the opinion of the twelve judges referred to in Entick, see Phillip Hamburger, The
Development of the Law of Seditious Libel and the Control of the Press, 37 STAN. L. REV.
661, 686 (1985).
92
Entick, 2 Wils. at 292.
93
Id.
94
19 How. St. Tr. at 1072.
95
See Fores v. Johnes, (1802) 170 Eng. Rep. 654, 654–55 (noting that plaintiff sold
prints to defendant and sued for payment and Justice Lawrence ruled that “the plaintiff may
recover; but I cannot permit him to do so for such whose tendency is immoral or obscene;
nor for such as are libels on individuals, and for which the plaintiff might have been
rendered criminally answerable for a libel”).
96
1819, 60 Geo. 3, c. 8, § 1 (U.K.), reprinted in 3 RICHARD BURN, THE JUSTICE OF THE
PEACE AND PARISH OFFICER 255–56 (1820).
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D. THE PAMPHLET WAR OF ’64
After the brouhaha in the Commons in February 1764, the Tories
undertook a propaganda campaign to vindicate the use of general warrants
in libel cases. Dr. Johnson, with characteristic pungency, declared that
general warrants were “a matter about which the people cared so very little,
that were a man to be sent over Britain to offer them an exemption from it
at a halfpenny a piece, very few would purchase it.”97 The Whigs had a
propaganda machine of their own and put it in gear.98
The Whigs’ first salvo following the equivocation in the Commons
was A Defence of the Minority in the House of Commons, on the Question
Relating to General Warrants, written by Charles Townshend but printed
without attribution by John Almon in 1764.99 The Defence of the Minority
focused primarily on general warrants, but also asked rhetorically what law
then in force could deter Halifax from issuing another general warrant by
which his messengers might enter another author’s “House abruptly,
alarming His family, keeping Him in close Custody; tumbling His most
secret and confidential Papers and Deeds carelessly into a Sack, as in the
former Instances, and trusting them to the Hand of a common and
unresponsible Person, without Schedule or Security for recovery of
them?”100
Townshend’s pamphlet inspired a rebuttal by Charles Lloyd, again
printed without attribution.101 This Defence of the Majority is said to have
“thoroughly crushed its rival.”102 There promptly appeared a surrebuttal,
printed again by Almon and presumably authored again by Townshend.103
This Reply emphasizes the dangers of seizing papers: “What private
Gentleman can think his Property or Reputation safe, if the Title Deeds, by
which he holds the one may be taken away, and every Secret of his Life be
exposed to hurt the other?”104
97

See ROBERT R. REA, THE ENGLISH PRESS IN POLITICS 1760–1774, at 107 (1963).
For an extensive survey of the controversy in England, see Schnapper, supra note 90,
at 884–913.
99
See id. at 897.
100
CHARLES TOWNSHEND, THE DEFENCE OF THE MINORITY IN THE HOUSE OF COMMONS,
ON THE QUESTION RELATING TO GENERAL WARRNTS 35–36 (London, J. Almon 1764).
101
CHARLES LLOYD, A DEFENCE OF THE MAJORITY IN THE HOUSE OF COMMONS, ON THE
QUESTION RELATING TO GENERAL WARRANTS, IN ANSWER TO THE DEFENCE OF THE MINORITY
(London, J. Wilkie, 2d ed. 1764). I am working with the second edition, which has an
addendum but does not appear to have been revised.
102
REA, supra note 97, at 108.
103
SIR WILLIAM MEREDITH, A REPLY TO THE DEFENCE OF THE MAJORITY, ON THE
QUESTION RELATING TO GENERAL WARRANTS (London, J. Almon 1764).
104
Id. at 19.
98
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The Reply was soon reinforced by a polemicist who “deserves to be
ranked among . . . the great Georgian pamphleteers.”105 The true identity of
the author (or authors) known as “Candor” and “Father of Candor” is still a
matter of conjecture.106 But it is generally agreed that the two pamphlets, A
Letter from Candor to the Public Advertiser107 and A Letter Concerning
Libels, Warrants, the Seizure of Papers, and Sureties for the Peace of
Behaviour,108 swept the field.109
Candor discusses private papers in the Letter to the Public Advertiser.
After condemning the Wilkes warrant for generality, Candor says:
[A]ny man is at liberty to think, and to put what thoughts he pleases upon paper,
provided he does not publish them. In the case, therefore, of a Libel, this inquisitorial
power of ransacking papers will not be endured. It would lead to the seizing of a man
and his papers for a libel, against whom there was no proof, merely slight suspicion,
under a hope that, among the private papers of his bureau, some proof might be found
which would answer the end. It is a fishing for evidence, to the disquiet of all men,
and to the violation of every private right; and is the most odious and infamous act, of
the worst sort of inquisitions, by the worst sort of men, in the most enslaved counties:
It is, in short, putting a man to the torture, and forcing him to give evidence against
110
himself.

Candor clearly described the seizure of papers as an evil distinct from
general warrants, and clearly linked it to the privilege against selfincrimination.
A still clearer exposition of the theory later adopted by Boyd appears
in Father of Candor’s A Letter Concerning Libels, Warrants, the Seizure of
Papers, and Sureties for the Peace of Behavior. The very title distinguishes
the issue of general warrants from the issue of seizing papers. For a
measured writer, Father of Candor expressed an extreme degree of
105

REA, supra note 97, at 110.
See, e.g., ANNABEL PATTERSON, NOBODY’S PERFECT: A NEW WHIG INTERPRETATION
OF HISTORY 44–45 (2002) (attributing authorship to Almon in collaboration with Pratt);
DEBORAH D. ROBERTS, BOOKSELLER AS ROGUE: JOHN ALMON AND THE POLITICS OF
EIGHTEENTH CENTURY PUBLISHING 23 (1986) (authorship variously attributed to Pratt, John
Dunning, or the two collaborating).
107
CANDOR, A LETTER FROM CANDOR TO THE PUBLIC ADVERTISER (London, J. Almon
1764).
108
FATHER OF CANDOR, A LETTER CONCERNING LIBELS, WARRANTS, THE SEIZURE OF
PAPERS, AND SURETIES FOR THE PEACE OF BEHAVIOUR (London, J. Almon, 5th ed. 1765)
(1764).
109
See, e.g., 10 CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF ENGLISH AND AMERICAN LITERATURE § 17
(1921), available at http://www.bartleby.com/220/1717.html (“This masterly pamphlet
attracted general admiration, and its cool and lucid reasoning, varied by an occasional ironic
humour, did not meet with any reply.”).
110
CANDOR, supra note 107, at 30–31.
106
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emotional antipathy to prying into private papers:
What then, can be more excruciating torture, than to have the lowest of mankind, such
fellows as Mooney, Watson, and the rest of them, enter suddenly into his house, and
forcibly carry away his scrutores, with all his papers of every kind, under a pretence
of law, because the Attorney-general had, ex officio, filed an information against the
author, printer and publisher of some pamphlet or weekly paper, and somebody had
told one of these greyhounds that this gentleman was thought by some people to be
111
the author!

The seizure of papers was an “absolute illegality” and an “abominable
outrage,”112 and the use of seized papers at a criminal trial “would be
making a man give evidence against and accuse himself, with a
vengeance.”113
The libel itself might be seized, but no other documents, because only
the libel was contraband:
It must either be sworn that I have certain stolen goods, or such a particular thing that
is criminal in itself, in my custody, before any magistrate is authorized to grant a
warrant to any man to enter my house and seize it. Nay further, if a positive oath be
made, and such a particular warrant be issued, it can only be executed upon the paper
or thing sworn to and specified, and in the presence of the owner or of somebody
114
intrusted by him, with the custody of it.

Father of Candor was well-known in America.115 On his website,
Roger Roots claims to have found more than 100 copies of Father of
Candor’s Letter Concerning Libels in American libraries, some, apparently,
once owned by Rufus King and Benjamin Franklin.116
The most popular tract to emerge from the Wilkes affair was
Britannia’s Intercession for the Deliverance of John Wilkes, a celebration
of Wilkes and liberty in mock-biblical rhetoric.117 Even this rather lowbrow
production made special mention of papers: “And they looked into his
dwelling, and searched for his papers, and all secret workings, and they
took them every one.”118

111

FATHER OF CANDOR, supra note 108, at 54.
Id. at 54.
113
Id. at 55–56.
114
Id. at 58.
115
See LEONARD LEVY, SEASONED JUDGMENTS 157 (1995) (Americans found a lot of
thunder “in Pitt, Camden, Wilkes, and in ‘Father of Candor,’ all of whom they knew well”).
116
Father of Candor’s “Letter Concerning Libels, Warrants [etc.][”], ROGER ROOTS,
available at http://rogerroots.org/contactus.html (last visited Mar. 4, 2013).
117
BRITANNIA’S INTERCESSION FOR THE DELIVERANCE OF JOHN WILKES, ESQ. FROM
PERSECUTION AND BANISHMENT TO WHICH IS ADDED A POLITICAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL
SERMON AND A DEDICATION TO L*** B*** (7th ed. London 1769).
118
Id. at 7.
112
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E. ENDGAME IN PARLIAMENT
In 1766 Bute’s successor, Grenville, was in turn replaced by the
Marquess of Rockingham.119 By then, Leach had declared general warrants
for libels illegal, and Entick had ruled the seizure of papers illegal.
“Accordingly, resolutions were now agreed to, condemning general
warrants, whether for the seizure of persons or papers, as illegal . . . .”120
The resolutions were distinct. The actual wording of the general warrants
resolution was not confined to libel, while the second resolution condemned
seizing the papers “of the author, printer, or publisher, of a libel, or the
supposed author, printer, or publisher of a libel.”121 Looking back on the
Rockingham administration, which lasted just over a year, Edmund Burke
celebrated its various accomplishments.122 The list includes these two
consecutive items:
The personal liberty of the subject was confirmed, by the resolution against general
warrants.
The lawful secrets of business and friendship were rendered inviolable, by the
123
resolution for condemning the seizure of papers.

From the speech Wilkes gave in court after his arrest, to the separate
opinions in Entick and Wilkes, to the Father of Candor pamphlets, to the
resolutions of the House, warrants for papers and general warrants were
seen as related, but distinct, abuses.
III. THE SEIZURE OF PAPERS IN AMERICA FROM THE ENGLISH
CONTROVERSY THROUGH THE FOUNDING ERA
A. AMERICAN INTEREST IN THE ENGLISH CONTROVERSY
We have long known that the tribulations of Wilkes were followed
closely in the colonies. We also have at least some direct evidence that
American Whigs followed the Entick litigation and understood the seizure
of papers as a distinct abuse. Eric Schnapper previously brought to light a
report of the Wilkes verdict in the Boston Gazette to the effect that this
“important decision” gave “every Englishman [ ] the satisfaction of seeing,
119

See 2 MAY, supra note 74, at 130.
Id.
121
Schnapper, supra note 90, at 910 (citation omitted). On the language of the
resolutions and their timing, see id. at 909–10.
122
1 EDMUND BURKE, A Short Account of a Late Short Administration (1766), in THE
WORKS OF THE RIGHT HONORABLE EDMUND BURKE 265, 265 (Boston, Little, Brown & Co.
rev. ed. 1865).
123
Id.
120
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that his house is his castle, and is not liable to be searched, nor his papers
pried into by the malignant curiosity of King’s Messengers, and an utter end
put to that unconstitutional practice . . . .”124
The Accessible Archives website maintains a searchable collection of
colonial newspapers.125 The most numerous items in the 1760s appear to be
issues of the South Carolina Gazette, a Patriot organ,126 although some
other papers also appear. The archive contains close coverage of the
Wilkesite cases, down to the names of counsel and the amount of damages,
and includes multiple references, some by Wilkes himself, to the distinct
evil of seizing papers.127 The “seizure of papers” was not an obscure issue
124
Schnapper, supra note 90, at 876 n.38 (quoting BOS. GAZETTE & COUNTRY J., Feb. 20,
1764, at 4).
125
ACCESSIBLE ARCHIVES, http://www.accessible.com/accessible/ (last visited March 4,
2013).
126
See SIDNEY KOBRE, THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE COLONIAL NEWSPAPER 147 (1943)
(listing the Gazette as a Patriot paper).
127
In chronological order, and abbreviating the Gazette as SCG, see: London, J 17, SCG,
Oct. 1, 1763 (“J 23. Yesterday the Rev. Mr. Entick, Mr. Arthur Beardmore, his clerk, and
Messrs. Wilson and Fell, were discharged by the court of King’s-Bench, from the
recognizance they were obliged to enter in Michaelmas Term, on account of the several
numbers of the Monitor, concerning which no prosecution has been carried on.”); id.
(“J. 7. . . . Yesterday one of the most important points of English liberty was determined at
Guildhall, before the right hon. lord chief justice Pratt, and a social [sic; should be “special”]
jury of eminent merchants, in a cause wherein William Huckell, one of the journey men
printers apprehended on account of the North-Briton, No. 45; was plaintiffs, and the king’s
messengers defendants; when after a hearing of ear [sic; should be “near”] twelve hours, and
many learned arguments on both sides, a verdict was given for the plaintiff in 300 l.
damages, and full costs of on which there was the greatest acclamations that could possibly
be shewn.”) (this report goes on to list the names of counsel for the parties); id. (“J. 9 . . .
Thursday morning about ten, came on the cause of James Lindsey, another of the
journeymen printers, plaintiff, for false imprisonment by three of the king’s messengers, on
account of No. 45 of the North-Briton. . . . The whole damages given against the King’s
messengers in that fourteen causes, which have been tried, amount to 2,900 £ besides all the
costs of suit, which will be very considerable. It is remarkable that this is the first attack that
has been made upon the authority of the secretaries of state, and will abolish the dangerous
practice of issuing general and anticonstitutional warrants.”); id. (“J 12 . . . Mr. Wilkes
appeared at all the late trials, and received [t]he repeated congratulations of the public . . . .
It is very remarkable, that most of the counsel for the journeymen printers were juniors. Mr.
serjeant Glynn is the youngest serjeant in England, and Mr. Wallace and Mr. Gardiner, were
admitted to the bar only last trinity term two years.”); id. (“J. 13. Next Michaelmas term will
be tried the actions which Mr. Wilkes has brought against, Philip Carteret Webb and Robert
Wood, Esq;’s.”); Summary of London Intelligence, from January 1764, to June Inclusive,
SCG, Oct. 1, 1764 (“May 4th, came or before lord chief justice Pratt. an action brought by
Mr. Arthur against Mr. Carrington, for forcibly [entering his] house and and [sic] taking
away many of his paper[s], and for false [imprisonment of] his person six days and on[e]
half, in the house of Mr. Blackmore, one of the said messengers; when after a [trial] of seven
hours, hi[s] lordship summed up the [case] in a genteel charge, and the jury went out, who in
three quarters hour brought in their [verdict] against the defendants for ONE THOUSDAND
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POUNDS DAMAG[E]S. Upon the determination of the jury, there was an universal shout
term [from] a considerable number of spectators.”); We Have Chosen to Fill Up this Day’s
Paper with a Few Late Articles, SCG, Aug. 25, 1764 (“Monday evening the fourteen
journeymen printers, who some time since obtained a verdict against the King’s messengers,
for false imprisonment, received their money from Mess’s, Carrington and Blackmore, two
of the said messengers, in manner following: thirteen of them who had 200 £ costs and
damages, received 120 £ each, and one of them, who had 300 £ decreed him, received 170 £
and to pay their attorney.”); Charles-Town, April 6, 1765, SCG, Apr. 6, 1765 (“LATE letters
from London inform us that . . . general warrants, the house had resolved, that it was
improper and unnecessary to fix, by a vote of the house, what ought to be deemed the law, in
the particular case of libels, while prosecution were actually depending in the courts of
law—widely different from what Wednesday’s General Gazette tells us, ‘That the matter
was cognizable only in the courts of law.’”); European Intelligence, S.C. & AM. GEN.
GAZETTE, Aug. 8, 1766 (reporting various resolutions offered in the House to condemn
general warrants and seizures of papers); London, November 14. The Report of His Royal
Highness the Duke, VA. GAZETTE, Mar. 7, 1766 (“Yesterday the Right Hon. Lord Camden
gave his opinion upon the granting of general warrants by Secretaries of State. After
enlarging on and explaining numbers of cases, which lasted two hours and twenty minutes,
his Lordship declared such warrants (except in cases of high treason) to be illegal,
oppressive, and unwarrantable.”); Naples, May 24, SCG, Sept. 1, 1766 (report from the
Brussels Gazette that “Mr. Wilkes, who on advice of the first resolution of the lower house,
which declared illegal General Warrants for arresting and carrying off persons and papers,
had ventured to [t]respass into his own country, in the confidence that this bill would pass in
like manner in the house of peers, has taken the resolution of quitting the kingdom, and
returning to Paris, finding himself unable to get his proscription taken off, and to procure his
re-establishments in his rights and privileges.”); London, June 21, S.C. GAZETTE &
COUNTRY J., Sept. 9, 1766 (containing a fuller quotation from the story from the Brussels
Gazette: “The Refusal of the upper House to approve of the Bill which had passed the House
of Commons, touching the Seizure of Papers in the Houses of private Persons, has Caused a
good Deal of Discontent in the Publick.”); London, March 4. A Letter from Parish, Dated
February 19, Says, S.C. GAZETTE & COUNTRY J., May 24, 1768 (publishing a letter from
Wilkes that read: “[s]ince the exertion of my firmness in an important moment, no minister
has once dared to issue a general warrant against your persons, or sign an order for the
seizure of your papers, and I trust that such despotism will never be again exerted over the
free subjects of this country.”); To the Worthy Liverymen of the City of London, VA.
GAZETTE, May 26, 1768 (publishing a letter from Wilkes that read: “The two important
questions of public liberty, respecting General Warrants and the Seizure of Papers, may
perhaps place me among those, who have deserved well of mankind, by an undaunted
firmness, [perse]verance and probity.”); To the Gentlemen, Clargy, and Freeholders of the
Country of Middlesex, SCG, Aug. 23, 1768 (publishing a letter from Wilkes to Middlesex
Gentlemen that said: “The General Warrant [under] which I was first apprehended, has been
adjudged illegal. The Seizure of my papers was condemned judicially.”); To the Gentlemen,
Clergy, and Freeholders of the Country of Middlesex, VA. GAZETTE, Sept. 15, 1768 (printing
Wilkes’s letter to Middlesex Gentlemen, including the separate references to general
warrants and the seizure of papers); London, December 7, SCG, Mar. 16, 1770 (“LONDON,
DECEMBER 7”: printing Justice Wilmot’s instructions to the jury in Wilkes v. Montagu, in
part as follows: “the plaintiff had been taken up unlawfully, has been imprisoned seven days,
had had his papers examined, and seized, that those papers have been likewise and illegally
taken notice of . . . he has had those papers taken from his house without the pretence of
right whatever.”).
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of law; it was the stuff of everyday political conversation in the colonies.
B. RECEPTION OF THE COMMON LAW OF SEARCH AND SEIZURE
Although the reception of English law in the newly independent
American states was not automatic or uniform, a basic pattern emerged.
The Americans adopted the English common law together with statutes in
force at the time of Independence, unless the English rule conflicted with a
natural right or a state constitution’s declaration of rights.128 This meant
that any judge or justice of the peace considering issuing a warrant to seize
papers who looked up the law would learn that, under Entick, such a
warrant was unknown to the common law.
The Founding-era justice system relied heavily on justices of the peace
(JPs), prominent citizens who agreed to serve as officials with authority,
both judicial and executive, over a wide variety of local issues. In their
judicial capacity, JPs had power to issue warrants to arrest and to search, as
well as to interrogate arrested suspects and determine whether to commit or
bail them. Professional lawyers wrote encyclopedic manuals to advise
these amateurs. The JP manuals provide a fertile source of evidence about
the Founding-era justice system. 129
Samuel Freeman’s Massachusetts Justice, published in 1795, compiles
forms for various writs a JP might be called upon to issue. The only form
provided under the heading for “search warrant” is for a warrant for stolen
goods.130 Other manuals did not leave the prohibition on warrants for
papers to implication. Eliphalet Ladd’s abridgement of a leading English
manual by Richard Burn, published for New Hampshire JPs in 1792,
prefaces the regurgitation of Burn with this terse paragraph: “General
search warrants are illegal. 2 Wils. 288. Lord Camden. Bill of rights of
128

See, e.g., DEL. CONST. art. 25 (1776) (“The common law of England, as-well as so
much of the statute law as has been heretofore adopted in practice in this State, shall remain
in force, unless they shall be altered by a future law of the legislature; such parts only
excepted as are repugnant to the rights and privileges contained in this constitution, and the
declaration of rights, &c., agreed to by this convention.”); N.J. CONST. art. XXII (1776)
(“That the common law of England, as well as so much of the statute law, as have been
heretofore practiced in this Colony, shall still remain in force, until they shall be altered by a
future law of the Legislature; such parts only excepted, as are repugnant to the rights and
privileges contained in this Charter; and that the inestimable right of trial by jury shall
remain confirmed as a part of the law of this Colony, without repeal, forever.”).
129
See Moglen, supra note 88, at 1096 (“[M]anuals provided JPs with an alphabetical
digest of information relating both to their common law and statutory responsibilities,
including forms for the dispatch of the most frequent civil and criminal business. Moreover,
the manuals contained basic articles on the subject of criminal investigation and adjudication
that changed very little over the years.”) (citations omitted).
130
SAMUEL FREEMAN, THE MASSACHUSETTS JUSTICE 269–70 (1795).
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Newhampshire [sic], article XIX.”131 The citation to Entick runs directly
into the New Hampshire Constitution’s Bill of Rights, which provided,
“Every subject hath a right to be secure from all unreasonable searches and
seizures of his person, his houses, his papers, and all his possessions.”132
William Walter Hening’s New Virginia Justice, published in 1795,
quoted the State Trials report of Entick: “On trespass, the jurors found a
special verdict; and Lord Camden, in delivering the resolution of the court,
observed, ‘That a warrant to seize and carry away papers in the case of
seditious libel was illegal and void.’”133 Hening went on to discuss Wilkes
v. Wood.134
Of the Founding-era manuals I have seen, some, like Ladd and
Hening, cite Entick and expressly prohibit warrants for papers. Others, like
Freeman, mention only warrants to search for stolen goods or fugitive
felons. None suggests common law authority to issue warrants for papers.
We have other direct evidence that some Founding-era American
lawyers were familiar with Entick v. Carrington. Joseph Hawley was a
Massachusetts Whig and associate of John Adams.135
Hawley’s
commonplace book includes a version of Otis’s argument in the Writs of
Assistance case in which Otis implores the court to “tear into rags this
remnant of Starchamber tyranny.”136 Other accounts of the argument do not
include this phrase, but identical language appears in Serjeant Glynn’s
argument in Entick. If Hawley inserted Glynn’s argument by either
accident or design, Hawley had to be familiar—intimately familiar—with
Entick itself.
Josiah Quincy Jr. was a leader in the Sons of Liberty and another
associate of John Adams (they were on the same side in the Boston
Massacre trial). Quincy’s commonplace book includes a citation to Entick
in a series of passages about statutory interpretation, with the notation
“Gen.le War:T.”137 It seems highly unlikely that Hawley, Quincy, and
Hening were alone. Hundreds of Americans attended the English Inns of

131

ELIPHALET LADD, BURN’S ABRIDGEMENT 357 (1792).
N.H. CONST. art. I, § 19.
133
WILLIAM WALLER HENING, THE NEW VIRGINIA JUSTICE 404 (1795) (citing Entick v.
Carrington, 11 How. St. Tr. 313, 321).
134
Id.
135
Regarding Hawley’s use of Glynn’s argument, I rely entirely on SMITH, supra note
61, at 239–41.
136
Entick, 2 Wils. at 283, 19 How. St. Tr. at 1039.
137
2 PORTRAIT OF A PATRIOT: THE MAJOR POLITICAL AND LEGAL PAPERS OF JOSIAH
QUINCY JUNIOR 229 (Daniel R. Coquillette & Neil L. York eds., 2007).
132
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Court.138
“Nearly one-half of the signers of the Declaration of
Independence and three-fifths of those who wrote the constitution had some
formal legal training.”139 Leaving lawyers aside, printers and polemicists
had a sharp incentive to know the law of seditious libel.
C. STATUTORY RESPECT FOR THE RULE OF ENTICK
Common law could be modified by statute. Late in the nineteenth
century, the Boyd Court would assert that an 1863 revenue measure:
[W]as the first act in this country, and we might say, either in this country or in
England, so far as we have been able to ascertain, which authorized the search and
seizure of a man’s private papers, or the compulsory production of them, for the
140
purpose of using them in evidence.

With one possible nineteenth-century exception, I have not found any such
pre-1863 statute.
A statute authorizing seizures of papers was proposed in the
Pennsylvania legislature in 1780.141 Pennsylvania was then governed by a
unicameral legislature and an executive council, established by a radical
constitution that was the focal point of local politics.142 Pennsylvania, with
the rest of the United States, was at war with Britain; the treason of General
Benedict Arnold, who had assumed celebrity status in Philadelphia in 1778,
was exposed only in the autumn of 1780.
All I can find of the proposed “bill for apprehending and punishing
persons corresponding or trading with the enemies of the united states [sic]”
is a debate on an amendment at the second reading of the bill in the
House.143 The operative language was that the Supreme Executive Council
would have power to issue warrants “to seize his, her or their papers who
may be suspected as aforesaid[.]”144
The proposal was condemned by one writing under the name of
Zuinglius in the Pennsylvania Gazette.145 Zuinglius wrote that “the seizure

138

NORMAN K. RISJORD, JEFFERSON’S AMERICA, 1760–1815, at 48 (2010).
Id. at 48–49.
140
Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 622–23 (1886).
141
See 1 JOURNAL OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF
PENNSYLVANIA 545 (1782) [hereinafter HOUSE JOURNAL] (referencing Dec. 5, 1780 journal
entry).
142
See ROBERT L. BRUNHOUSE, THE COUNTER-REVOLUTION IN PENNSYLVANIA 1776–
1790, at 53–121 (1942); ALLEN C. THOMAS, A HISTORY OF PENNSYLVANIA 143–61 (1913).
143
HOUSE JOURNAL, supra note 141, at 545.
144
Id. The entry records a vote on a motion to amend the bill to add “and charged by
oath or affirmation” before “aforesaid.” The amendment was defeated.
145
Zuinglius, For the PENNSYLVANIA GAZETTE, PA. GAZETTE, Dec. 20, 1780.
139
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of papers” “in the case of Wilkes in England, has been shewn to be contrary
to common law.”146 The common law of England:
[H]as been declared, by act of Assembly, to be the birth right of these citizens; and if
that were not so, yet the possession of private papers, as of our secret thoughts, is a
natural right which we do not give up when we enter into society, and which no law
147
can justly take from us.

Further, he wrote, “An act of Assembly, like a statute of England, may
restrain the common law, if it shall please the legislators; though that, I
presume, will be seldom found adviseable [sic]. But an invasion of the
natural rights of men is in all cases, tyrannical and arbitrary.”148
The only difference between Zuinglius in 1780 and Boyd in 1884 is
resort to the constitutional provision as a trump on the statute.
Pennsylvania’s 1776 constitution included a declaration of rights, including
a declaration that “the people have a right to hold themselves, their houses,
papers, and possessions free from search and seizure . . . .”149 The
provision, however, was hortatory, continuing:
[A]nd therefore warrants without oaths or affirmations first made, affording a
sufficient foundation for them, and whereby any officer or messenger may be
commanded or required to search suspected places, or to seize any person or persons,
his or their property, not particularly described, are contrary to that right, and ought
150
not to be granted.

Given that the applicable constitutional provision did not purport to bind the
assembly, it might seem reasonable that Zuinglius relied on natural rather
than constitutional law. Zuinglius added this final remark: “I shall conclude
by observing, that this I believe is the only state, where a law of this kind
has been thought necessary to be established. Even those states invaded by
the enemy have not thought it necessary.”151
Whether the objections of Zuinglius or the cooling of wartime passions
carried the issue cannot be determined. The proposed bill for seizing papers
never passed into law.152 What seems clear is that proponents of the power
146

A * note cites “3 Bur. 1763 Wil. b. 151.” Id.
Id.
148
Id.
149
PA CONST. art. I, § 10 (1776).
150
Id.
151
Zuinglius, supra note 145.
152
No such bill appears in 10 THE STATUTES AT LARGE OF PENNSYLVANIA FROM 1682 TO
1801, at 43–259 (James T. Mitchell & Henry Flanders eds., Wm. Stanley Ray 1904)
(containing acts and documents from the regular session of the 1780 General Assembly of
the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania), available at http://www.palrb.us/stlarge/browse/get
page.php?volno=10&typedoc=act&sessyr=1780&ss=0.
147
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to seize papers felt the need for statutory authority, that opponents objected
to this heretical idea, that the opponents prevailed, and that the failed
proposal was an aberration from American practice even in wartime.
D. STATE SEARCH-AND-SEIZURE PROVISIONS BEFORE THE
CONSTITUTION OF 1789
After Independence the new states set up governments, typically
enacting written constitutions accompanied by declarations or bills of
rights. The earliest state provisions—Delaware, Maryland, North Carolina,
Pennsylvania, and Virginia, all adopted in 1776—were rifle-shot
prohibitions of general warrants.153 All the later provisions—Vermont
(1777), Massachusetts (1780), and New Hampshire (1783)—adopted
“double-barreled” provisions declaring a general right against unreasonable
searches and seizures coupled with a specific prohibition of general
warrants.154 In 1790, Pennsylvania adopted a new constitution with a
double-barreled provision.155
The Vermont, Massachusetts, New
Hampshire, and (both) Pennsylvania constitutions refer specifically to
“papers.”156
E. ANTI-FEDERALIST CONCERNS AND AMENDMENTS PROPOSED
DURING RATIFICATION OF THE 1789 CONSTITUTION
The want of a Bill of Rights was the central objection to the proposed
Constitution of 1789, and this objection included explicit references to
search and seizure.157 Apprehensions about the new government’s search
powers took formal and collective form in amendments proposed either by
the majority to accompany ratification, or by delegates dissenting from
ratification. Maryland proposed the simple ban on general warrants (so did
the Pennsylvania dissenters),158 while Virginia proposed declaring that
153

See NEIL H. COGAN, THE COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS 234–35 (1997).
Id. at 234.
155
Id. at 235.
156
Id. at 234–35.
157
See, e.g., Reply to Wilson’s Speech: “Centinel” [Samuel Bryan] II, Freeman’s
Journal (Philadelphia), Oct. 24, 1787, reprinted in I THE DEBATE ON THE CONSTITUTION:
FEDERALIST AND ANTIFEDERALIST SPEECHES 77, 89 (Bernard Bailyn ed., 1993) (“[T]here is
no declaration, . . . that the people have a right to hold themselves, their houses, papers and
possessions free from search or seizure; and that therefore [general] warrants . . . are contrary
to that right and ought not to be granted.”). For a summary of anti-federalist search-andseizure concerns, see CUDDIHY, supra note 66, at 673–80.
158
See Robert Whitehill’s Amendments and the Final Vote, December 12, 1787, in
I DEBATE ON THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 157, at 871, 872; In Convention of the Delegates
of the People of the State of Maryland, April 28, 1788, in II DEBATE ON THE CONSTITUTION
154
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“every freeman has a right to be secure from all unreasonable searches, and
seizures of his person, his papers and property; all [general] warrants
therefore . . . are dangerous and ought not to be granted.”159 North Carolina
and New York (which had no state constitutional provision) adopted a
similar formulation including a declaration of a general right to security in
person, papers, and property.160 The Massachusetts ratification message
proposed amendments but not one about search and seizure.161 The
Massachusetts minority, dissenting from ratification, resolved only that the
Constitution never be construed “to subject the people to unreasonable
searches and seizures of their persons, papers or possessions.”162
Despite the variations a pattern is fairly clear. After 1776, no state
constitutional provision reverted to Virginia’s simple ban on general
warrants. The only state ratifying majority to propose a federal amendment
in those terms was Maryland. The constitutions of Massachusetts,
Pennsylvania, New Hampshire, and Vermont included declarations of a
right to be secure in papers as well as other property; and in their
ratification messages, New York, North Carolina, and Virginia adopted this
formulation.
F. CONGRESSIONAL DRAFTING OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
IN 1789
The drafting history of the Fourth Amendment is largely lost and what
remains is dubious.163 According to the Annals of Congress, James
Madison’s initial proposal in the House of Representatives read as follows:
The rights of the people to be secured in their persons; their houses, their papers, and
their other property, from all unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated
by warrants issued without probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, or not
particularly describing the places to be searched, or the persons or things to be
164
seized.

The Committee of Eleven sent the following language to the floor of the
House: “The right of the people to be secured in their persons, houses,

552, 554 (Bernard Bailyn ed., 1993) (proposed amendments).
159
Form of Ratification, Which was Read and Agreed to by the Convention of Virginia,
in II DEBATE ON THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 158, at 557, 560 (resolutions of Virginia).
160
See id. at 567 (North Carolina); id. at 538 (New York).
161
See The Form of Ratification of Massachusetts, Feb. 6, 1788, in I DEBATE ON THE
CONSTITUTION, supra note 157, at 943–45.
162
See COGAN, supra note 153, at 232–33.
163
See CUDDIHY, supra note 66, at 732.
164
1 ANNALS OF CONG. 452 (1789) (Joseph Gales ed., 1790).
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papers, and effects, shall not be violated by warrants issuing without
probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and not particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized.”165
Elbridge Gerry thought the omission of the words “against
unreasonable searches and seizures” was a “mistake,” and his motion to
insert them was passed.166 Representative Egert Benson of New York
thought the “declaratory provision [‘by warrants issuing’] was good so far
as it went” but moved to add the words “and no warrant shall issue.”167 The
Annals of Congress record this motion as losing, but either this record is
incorrect or Benson succeeded in adding his proposed language in his
capacity as chair of a committee on style. Madison described the published
reports later included in the Annals as “frequently erroneous and sometimes
perverted.”168 The Senate made no changes to the House proposal and there
is no record of the Senate debates.169 What emerged from Benson’s
committee is the language that Congress sent to the country and that we
have today in the Fourth Amendment.
G. EARLY PRACTICE
There are several examples of search-and-seizure practices approved
during the Founding era. These include the compelled disclosure of
documents in civil litigation; the authorization of warrants to enforce
Founding-era customs duties; and warrants issued to enforce the Sedition
Act of 1798. To begin with civil discovery, the common law did not
provide for any pretrial discovery of documents.170 Instead, the party
seeking discovery could initiate an action in equity, in support of the action
at law.171 Section 15 of the Judiciary Act simplified this arrangement by
authorizing courts:
[I]n the trial of actions at law, on motion and due notice thereof being given, to
require the parties to produce books or writings in their possession or power, which
contain evidence pertinent to the issue, in cases and under circumstances where they
165

Id. at 783.
Id.
167
Id.
168
CUDDHIHY, supra note 66, at 731.
169
See, e.g., PAULINE MAIER, RATIFICATION 453–54 (2010).
170
See, e.g., 2 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 1485, at 704
(Boston, Little, Brown & Co. 1866) (“Another defect of a similar nature is the want of a
power in the courts of common law to compel the production of deeds, books, writings, and
other things, which are in the custody, or power of one of the parties, and are material to the
right, title, or defence of the other.”) (footnote omitted).
171
Id.
166
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might be compelled to produce the same by the ordinary rules of proceeding in
172
chancery . . . .

Boyd seems quite accurate, however, that “the ordinary rules of proceeding
in chancery” did not extend to compelling the disclosure of documents
exposing the discovering party to criminal prosecutions, penalties, or
forfeitures.173
The early revenue laws authorized searches for, and seizures of,
undutied goods. For example, the first Act to regulate the Collection of
Duties authorized warrants for “goods, wares and merchandise” subject to
duty.174 No authority to seize papers is mentioned.
Even under the English law of seditious libel, the prosecution had to
prove that the defendant was somehow involved in publishing the libel—as
author, printer, or distributor. Section 3 of the 1798 Sedition Act went
further, providing that the accused might “give in evidence in his defence,
the truth of the matter contained in the publication charged as a libel. And
the jury who shall try the cause shall have a right to determine the law and
the fact, under the direction of the court, as in other cases.”175
Quite aside from the alleged libel itself, other papers, such as
correspondence and contracts, might be useful evidence of authorship or
publication. They might also, at least potentially, admit the falsity of the
publication. The Act said nothing about enforcement. Discussions of
enforcement make no mention of warrants to seize papers.176 Republican
journalists were indicted by grand juries and arrested on warrants, but I
have seen no evidence of search warrants to search for and seize personal
papers.
Judge Hobart’s warrant to arrest William Durell, dated July 14, 1799,
directs the marshal only to “apprehend and take William Durell, of Mount
Pleasant in the Country of Westchester, Printer, and to bring him forthwith
before me, to answer unto such matters of misdemeanor as on behalf of the
said United States shall be objected against him,” followed by a particular

172

Federal Judiciary Act, ch. 20, § 15, 1 Stat. 73 (1789).
See, e.g., 2 STORY, supra note 170, § 1494 at 710 (“[Courts of equity] will not compel
a discovery in aid of a criminal prosecution; or of a penal action; or of a suit in its nature
partaking of such a character; or in a case involving moral turpitude; for it is against the
genius of the common law to compel a party to accuse himself; and it is against the general
principles of equity to aid in the enforcement of penalties or forfeitures.”).
174
Ch. 5, § 24, 1 Stat. 29, 43 (1789).
175
Sedition Act, ch. 73, § 3, 1 Stat. 596 (1798).
176
See JAMES MORTON SMITH, FREEDOM’S FETTERS: THE ALIEN AND SEDITION LAW AND
AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES 182–87 (1956).
173

2013]

DEAREST PROPERTY

83

allegation of criminal libel.177 Anthony Haswell, another publisher charged
with sedition, described the warrant for his arrest: “You are hereby
commanded to arrest Anthony Haswell, of Bennington, Printer, and cause
him forthwith to appear before our circuit court of the United States, now
sitting in Rutland. Of this fail not at your peril.”178 In marked contrast to
the Wilkes and Entick warrants, no power to search, let alone to seize
papers, is included in the warrants for Durell and Haswell.179
Taken together, the evidence suggests that Americans followed the
Wilkes affair with great interest, absorbed the message of the separate
iniquity of seizing papers, carried Entick into American law, and refused to
tamper with the common law by statute for seventy years after 1791. Did
they understand the Fourth Amendment to perpetuate the common law rule
against any statutory modification whatsoever? That question did not reach
the Supreme Court until the famous ruling in Boyd.
IV. THE UNTOLD STORY OF BOYD V. UNITED STATES
A. THE COMMON LAW BACKGROUND
The story of the Boyd case properly begins with a statute authorizing
customs officers to seize the books and papers of importers suspected of
evading taxes. The story begins with a statute because Entick, quite aside
from the federal Constitution, declared the common law. Louisiana
excepted because of her civil law tradition, all the American states received
the English common law after Independence.180 Typically reception was
qualified by rejecting doctrines contrary to fundamental rights or by
acknowledging that the legislators could alter the common law rules.181
Entick was a libertarian ruling and was not contrary to fundamental
rights. So until the prohibition on warrants for papers was either
177

The National Archives has posted an image of the warrant, in Hobart’s hand, on its
website. See United States v. William Durell: Violating the Alien and Sedition Acts, NAT’L
ARCHIVES, http://www.archives.gov/education/lessons/images/alien-and-sedition.pdf (last
visited Mar. 6, 2013).
178
Tyler Resch, Anthony Haswell is Jailed!, BENNINGTON MUSEUM, http://www.benning
tonmuseum.org/anthony-haswell.html (last visited Dec. 27, 2012).
179
A review of all known prosecutions under the Sedition Act makes no mention of any
search warrants. See Gordon T. Belt, Sedition Act of 1798—A Brief History of Arrests,
Indictments, Mistreatment & Abuse, FIRST AMENDMENT CENTER (Feb. 29, 2009),
http://www.firstamendmentcenter.org/madison/wp-content/uploads/2011/03/Sedition_Act_
cases.pdf.
180
See, e.g., LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 110–11 (1985).
181
See id.; Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 337 n.9 (2001) (“Founding-era
receptions of common law, whether by state constitution or state statute, generally provided
that common-law rules were subject to statutory alteration.”) (citations omitted).
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superseded by statute or overruled judicially, a warrant for papers would be
a nullity at common law. Entick v. Carrington is cited, either by court or
counsel, in sixteen reported antebellum American decisions.182 Many of
these are not search-and-seizure cases at all, and not all of the search cases
say anything about papers.183
Nonetheless the citations indicate that Entick was good law in
antebellum America. The three cases that discuss private papers, moreover,
suggest that the private-papers aspect of Entick was just as authoritative as
any other aspect of the decision. In United States v. Crandell,184 Crandell
stood trial for criminal libel and, citing Entick, objected to the introduction
of pamphlets found in execution of a warrant to “search for and seize any
incendiary pamphlets or papers which should be found in the defendant’s
possession . . . .”185 The court ruled “that if the matter now proposed to be
read, is not charged in the indictment, and would be, of itself, a substantive
libel, and therefore indictable, it cannot be given in evidence.”186
Contraband or instrumentalities of crime were not exempt from seizure
simply because they happened to be paper, but papers of evidentiary value
that were not at least alleged to be criminal in themselves should not have
been seized and could not be used at trial. The jury acquitted.
In Commonwealth v. Dana,187 the defendant challenged his conviction
for possessing illegal lottery tickets on the ground that the tickets had been
seized on the authority of an invalid warrant. After discussing Entick in
detail, the court held that:
[T]he right of search and seizure does not depend on the question whether the papers
or property seized were intended to be used in evidence against the offender or not.
The possession of lottery tickets with the intent to sell them was a violation of law.
The defendant’s possession, therefore, was unlawful, and the tickets were liable to
182
A Westlaw search for “(entick /s carrington) & date(before 1860)” performed October
23, 2011, returned sixteen hits.
183
In Grumon v. Raymond, 1 Conn. 40 (1814), the plaintiff sued in trespass and the
court, having ruled defendant’s warrant was void for generality, cited Entick for the
proposition “that if a warrant which is against law be granted, such as no justice of the peace
or other magistrate, high or low, has power to issue, the justice who issues and the officer
who executes it are liable in an action of trespass.” Id. at 45. In Bell v. Clapp, 10 Johns. 263
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1813), plaintiff sued defendant for trespass, and the court sustained
defendant’s demurrer based on a warrant for stolen flour. Id. at 266. The court cited Entick
for the proposition that a particularized warrant for stolen goods, “so well guarded, [is] a
lawful authority.” Id. at 265.
184
4 D.C. (4 Cranch) 683 (1836).
185
Id. at 691.
186
Id. at 692.
187
43 Mass. (2 Met.) 329 (1841).
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seizure as belonging to the corpus delicti, or for the purpose of preventing any further
188
violations of law.

The second ground of decision in Dana was that illegally seized items
could be used in evidence notwithstanding their tainted history.189 This
ground, however, reinforces the distinction between private papers and
contraband papers. The accused would have the right to the return of
illegally seized papers, unless they were contraband.190
In Robinson v. Richardson,191 the court struck down a statute
authorizing creditors to obtain warrants for books and papers of insolvent
debtors. After discussing Entick, the court held the statute unconstitutional
because it authorized warrants for the benefit of civil litigants.192
There is no negative reference to Entick v. Carrington in any of the
sixteen reported decisions. Nor does any reported antebellum decision
permit the seizure of private papers under warrant.
Any official contemplating a warrant to seize private papers who
looked up the law would have concluded that such a warrant was illegal.
Robinson shows how the constitutional issue could arise: A legislature
could pass a statute that expressly authorized the courts to issue search
warrants for private papers. The statute would trump Entick given Entick’s
role as a common law precedent. At that point the statute would be subject
to constitutional challenge, and the issue would arise as to whether Entick’s
per se prohibition of seizing private papers was incorporated into the
constitutional search-and-seizure provision. The first federal statute
authorizing warrants to seize papers was a Civil War revenue measure
adopted in 1863.

188

Id. at 337.
See id. (“Admitting that the lottery tickets and materials were illegally seized, still this
is no legal objection to the admission of them in evidence.”).
190
The Supreme Court would not reach this result until more than fifty years after Dana,
but the logic is straightforward. See Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 398 (1914)
(holding that “the letters in question were taken from the house of the accused by an official
of the United States, acting under color of his office, in direct violation of the constitutional
rights of the defendant; that having made a seasonable application for their return, which was
heard and passed upon by the court, there was involved in the order refusing the application
a denial of the constitutional rights of the accused, and that the court should have restored
these letters to the accused”).
191
79 Mass. (13 Gray) 454 (1859).
192
Id. at 457 (“All searches therefore, which are instituted and pursued upon the
complaint or suggestion of one party into the house or possessions of another, in order to
secure a personal advantage, and not with any design to afford aid in the administration of
justice in reference to acts or offences in violation of penal laws, must be held to be
unreasonable, and consequently under our constitution unwarrantable, illegal and void.”).
189
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B. THE 1863 STATUTE
Waging war costs money, and the Civil War was no exception. Prior
to hostilities the government had relied largely on import duties to fund its
operations.193 As it became clear that the war would not be short and cheap,
Congress resorted to paper money, excise taxes, a rudimentary income tax,
and increases in tariffs.194 By the end of the war, domestic excise taxes
were the single largest source of federal revenue, but tariffs were still
supplying more revenue than the income tax.195
Wherever there are taxes, there will also be tax evasion. In November
of 1862, Treasury Secretary Salmon P. Chase dispatched the department’s
solicitor, Edwin Jordan, to investigate and report on corruption in the New
York Customs House.
Chase forwarded Jordan’s report to E.B.
Washburne, the Chairman of the House Committee on Commerce, who
ordered it printed.196
Jordan reported what was notorious already—corruption in the
customs house was rampant. While there was “very considerable direct
smuggling” of “jewelry, laces, rich silks, and other costly goods,” “the most
usual mode in which frauds [were] committed [was] by the use of invoices,
in which the goods to which they relate[d] [were] falsely described, or
undervalued.”197 According to Jordan, “Under existing laws, there is no
adequate security against the use of false and fraudulent invoices, and there
would often be great difficulty, even on the part of the most competent and
faithful officers, especially in cases of undervaluation, in detecting the
frauds . . . .”198
Jordan reiterated his earlier proposal for legislative reforms. These
proposals included a specialized enforcement officer in Washington, D.C.,
regulation of invoice practices, criminal penalties for fraud, prohibitions on
“emoluments” to customs agents from importers, and “[p]rovisions
designed to facilitate the procurement of proof of fraudulent practices.”199

193
See W. ELLIOT BROWNLEE, FEDERAL TAXATION IN AMERICA 13–14 (2d ed. 2004)
(“[T]he tax regime that followed the creation of the new constitutional order was based on
customs duties; it lasted until the Civil War, making it the longest in American history.”).
194
See STEVEN R. WEISMAN, THE GREAT TAX WARS 44 (2002).
195
See BROWNLEE, supra note 193, at 35 (noting that excise taxes accounted for 50% of
federal revenue, tariffs for 29%, the income tax for 21%).
196
See S.P. CHASE, TO PREVENT AND PUNISH FRAUD, H.R. MISC. DOC. NO. 18 (1863)
(letter from the Secretary of the Treasury to the House of Representatives).
197
Id. at 5.
198
Id.
199
Id. at 8.
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Chase sent Jordan’s report to Washburne on February 9, 1863. The
next day, Washburne introduced Jordan’s proposed legislation.200 On
March 3, An Act to prevent and punish Frauds upon the Revenue passed
into law.201 The provisions “designed to facilitate the procurement of
proof” included the following from the seventh section of the Act202:
[W]henever it shall be made to appear, by affidavit, to the satisfaction of the district
judge of any district within the United States, that any fraud on the revenue has been
at any time actually committed, or attempted . . . said judge shall forthwith issue his
warrant, directed to the collector of the port . . . to enter any place or premises where
any invoices, books, or papers relating to such merchandise or fraud are deposited,
and to take and carry the same away to be inspected; and any invoices, books or
papers so received or taken shall be retained by the officer receiving the same, for the
use of the United States, so long as the retention thereof may be necessary, subject to
203
the control and direction of the Solicitor of the Treasury.

The Boyd opinion asserts that:
[This] act of 1863 was the first act in this country, and we might say, either in this
country or in England, so far as we have been able to ascertain, which authorized the
search and seizure of a man’s private papers, or the compulsory production of them,
for the purpose of using them in evidence against him in a criminal case, or in a
204
proceeding to enforce the forfeiture of his property.

Radical as it may have been, the measure excited no floor debate that I
have found. In context this is not surprising. The bill passed into law on
March 3, the last day of a session of Congress dealing with the gravest
crisis in American history. Following the heavily qualified Union victory at
Antietam the previous September, Lincoln declared emancipation on
January 1, 1863.205 The Union was engaged in a desperate effort to
suppress treason committed for the sake of slavery; the “victory” at

200

CONG. GLOBE, 37th Cong., 3d Sess. 861 (1863) (statement of Rep. Washburne).
Ch. 76, 12 Stat. 737 (1863); CONG. GLOBE, 37th Cong., 3d Sess. 1489 (1863).
202
The enacted legislation appears identical to the proposed bill, H.R. 736, 37th Cong.
(1863), available at http://memory.loc.gov/cgi-bin/ampage?collId=llhb&fileName=037/llhb
037.db&recNum=3559.
In the Senate, Fessenden, as chair of the Committee on Finance, introduced the
measure as S.B. 506 on February 6 and then with minor amendments not touching the
warrant provision again on February 10. See CONG. GLOBE, 37th Cong., 3d Sess. 750, 837
(1863) (statements of Sen. Fessenden). The markup of the Senate Bill dated February 10 is
available online at http://memory.loc.gov/cgi-bin/ampage?collId=llsb&fileName=037/llsb
037.db&recNum=1848. Given the dates, it seems plausible to suppose that Chase had
conveyed Jordan’s report to Fessenden but that the report was printed only by the House.
203
Ch. 76, § 7, 12 Stat. 737, 740.
204
Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 622–23 (1886).
205
See, e.g., 1 SHELBY FOOTE, THE CIVIL WAR 707 (1986).
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Antietam cost 12,000 casualties.206 That same third of March, as the
session expired, Congress passed the first conscription act.207 There was
little time for fussing over revenue measures. If there had been time, it was
not a season for constitutional scruples.208
C. POSTWAR LEGISLATION AND CONSTITUTIONAL
CHALLENGES
The war left the Union deeply in debt, but economic expansion and
end-of-war spending permitted a degree of postwar tax relief.209 The
postbellum Republican Congress chose to retain high tariffs and an income
tax while phasing out unpopular excise taxes.210 The continued reliance on
import duties implied the continued need to police fraud in the customs
houses.
On March 2, 1867 (again the very end of the session, and the same day
as the income tax bill was enacted211), Congress passed An Act to regulate
the Disposition of the Proceeds of Fines, Penalties, and Forfeitures incurred
under the Laws relating to the Customs.212 The second section of the Act
reiterated the seventh section of the 1863 Act, the sole modification being
that warrants to seize books and papers were to be directed to the marshal of
the court rather than the customs collector.213 Again there appears to have
been no floor debate. Again it was the last day of session, and other
business pressed (the income tax bill and the Tenure in Office Act214 passed
that same day).
Constitutional issues were, however, emerging.216 In 1868 Congress
206

Id. at 702.
See, e.g., RICHARD F. SELCER, CIVIL WAR AMERICA 1850–1875, at 62 (2006).
208
Cf. Ex parte Merryman, 17 F. Cas. 144 (C.C.D. Md. 1861).
209
See WEISMAN, supra note 194, at 93–96.
210
BROWNLEE, supra note 193, at 36–39; WEISMAN, supra note 194, at 95–103.
211
Tax Anti-Injunction Act of 1867, ch. 169, 14 Stat. 475 (1867) (current version at
26 U.S.C. § 7421(a) (2006)).
212
Ch. 188, 14 Stat. 547 (1867); CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 2d Sess. 2004 (1867).
213
Id. § 2.
214
Tenure of Office Act of 1867, ch. 154, §§ 1, 3, 6, 14 Stat. 431 (1867) (repealed 1887).
The Act provided the predicate for impeaching President Andrew Johnson.
216
I have seen a reference to one such challenge from 1867, a document by Sidney
Webster called, “In matter of petition of Galwey & Casado, and order of Judge Betts thereon
power of the government to enter private premises, search, seize, and carry away private
papers.” I have not yet seen this particular source. Webster was a prominent lawyer for
importers and is said to have won the first million-dollar fee in American history by
successfully representing the importer of French silk ribbons. See 19 THE HARV.
207
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adopted An Act for the Protection in certain Cases of Persons making
Disclosures as Parties, or testifying as Witnesses.217 The Act provided
that:
[N]o answer or other pleading of any party, and no discovery, or evidence obtained by
means of any judicial proceeding from any party or witness in this or any foreign
country, shall be given in evidence, or in any manner used against such party or
witness, or his property or estate, in any court of the United States, or in any
proceeding by or before any officer of the United States, in respect to any crime, or
for the enforcement of any penalty or forfeiture by reason of any act or omission of
218
such party or witness.

The purpose of the 1868 statute was to facilitate revenue collections by
obviating constitutional objections to compelled discovery.219
The relationship between the 1868 exclusionary rule and the
authorization of warrants for papers in the 1867 Act is unclear. The Boyd
opinion asserts that the 1868 law “abrogated and repealed the most
objectionable part of the act of 1867 . . . .”220 On the other hand, in the
circuit court decision Stockwell v. United States, rendered in the April term
of court in 1870, Judge Clifford rejected challenges both to the legality of a
warrant for papers and to the use of the seized documents in evidence.221
The court rejected the Fourth Amendment challenge to § 2 of the 1867 Act
because “it is not perceived that any greater objection can be taken to a
warrant to search for books, invoices, and other papers appertaining to an
illegal importation than to one authorizing such a search for the imported
goods.”222 Judge Clifford rejected the objection to use of the seized papers
in evidence because “invoices, books, or papers so seized, like the
implements of crime, or stolen goods seized on search warrants, may in a
proper case be given in evidence against the offender and perpetrator of the

GRADUATES MAG. 170 (1910).
217
Ch. 13, 15 Stat. 37 (1868).
218
Id. § 1.
219
CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 2d Sess. 951 (1868) (statement of Sen. Frelinghuysen).
220
Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 632 (1886).
221
Stockwell v. United States, 23 F. Cas. 116 (C.C.D. Me. 1870), aff’d, 80 U.S. 531
(1871). The Supreme Court opinion does not address the legality of the warrant or the
admissibility of the documents. The circuit court opinion identifies both challenges:
Two objections were taken by the defendants, at the trial, to the admissibility of the books,
papers and documents as offered in evidence: I. That the court was not authorized to issue nor
the marshal to execute the warrant in question. II. That the district attorney could not, if
objected to by the defendants, put in evidence against them papers from his own possession,
obtained and placed there by force of the warrant.

Id. at 120.
222
Id. at 121.

90

DONALD A. DRIPPS

[Vol. 103

fraud.”223
Before the Supreme Court, however, Stockwell raised only two issues:
(1) the use of a civil action to recover a double penalty under an Act of
1823, and (2) a jury instruction that imputed Stockwell’s knowledge of
illegal importation to other members of his firm.224 The Supreme Court
rejected these challenges.225 Stockwell sheds no light on the constitutional
issues surrounding the seizure of papers, but does indicate that the 1868 Act
did not put an immediate end to the practice of issuing warrants for papers
under the 1867 Act.226 Arguably, the 1868 exclusionary rule might have
been limited to oral testimony and documents surrendered by the target,
exclusive of documents seized under warrant.227
In 1872, Cephas Brainerd, another lawyer for import interests,
published a pamphlet attacking both the seizure of papers and the reliance
on informants in customs investigations.228 Brainerd invoked Entick and
the resolutions condemning general warrants and seizures of papers:
This inquisitorial warrant is open to every condemnatory observation made by Lord
Camden In the case of the general warrants in the time of Wilkes, Entick and [the]
“monitor or British Freeholder”. . . . upon a charge made on information and belief
that a crime has been committed in regard to a particular importation, all the books
and papers of a mercantile firm are stripped from their warehouse or dwellings under
the pretence that they contain evidence of the particular crime, and these are retained
in the custody of Customs House officials and informers, all interested pecuniarily in
229
the discovery of a fraud, until they see fit to return them to their owner.

Brainerd followed up with a sarcastic bow to evenhandedness, noting that
in all fairness it should be noted that one judge—Scroggs!—had vouched
for the legality of general warrants.230
Despite the clarity of his claim that the warrants authorized by the
223

Id. at 123 (citing Commonwealth v. Dana, 43 Mass. (2 Met.) 329 (1841)).
See Brief of the Plaintiff in Error at 3–4, Stockwell v. United States, 80 U.S. 531
(1871) (No. 76-5876).
225
Stockwell, 80 U.S. at 549–52.
226
See Transcript of Record at 20–21, Stockwell, 80 U.S. 531 (observing that the search
warrant issued March 30, 1868, and the statute became law on February 25, 1868).
227
This was the position taken later by the court in United States v. Hughes, 26 F. Cas.
417, 419 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1875) (“The statute speaks of evidence or discovery obtained from
the party or witness, and not that obtained from invoices and bills of lading which have been
wrested from him.”).
228
CEPHAS BRAINERD, THE CUSTOMS REVENUE LAWS: SUGGESTIONS FOR THEIR
AMENDMENT, IN REGARD TO THE SEIZURE OF BOOKS; THE DISTRIBUTION OF PENALTIES; THE
LIMITATION OF ACTS, ETC. (1872).
229
Id. at 13–14 (citations omitted).
230
Id. at 15.
224
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1867 Act are “flatly in contradiction of Article IV of the Amendments,” 231
Brainerd did not propose outright repeal. Brainerd’s proposal “concede[d]
the right of, and the necessity as well for a seizure and examination of
books and papers—it seeks only to limit its exercise within a liberal
construction, toward the Government, of the Fourth Amendment to the
Constitution.”232 His proposal for a reformed process for seizing papers
remains interesting because it suggested some middle ground between
inviolability for papers under Entick and Boyd and the modern equivalence
of papers with other “effects.”
Brainerd proposed requiring an affidavit by a government official
alleging specific facts amounting to a prima facie case of fraud before a
warrant would issue.233 Moreover, he proposed sealing the papers to be
seized and having them inspected within two days in front of a United
States commissioner with a right of appearance for the importer personally
or through counsel.234 Any specific entries or items could be used in
evidence only if certified copies were filed with the clerk of the court, and
both sides would have the right to memorialize entries for use as
evidence.235 After twelve days, the books would have to be “returned
without mutilation.”236
The most sophisticated and celebrated constitutional attack on the
seizure of private papers came from Sherburne Blake Eaton.237 Eaton’s
clients eventually came to include J.P. Morgan and Thomas Edison,238 from
which we may infer that he was the best that money could buy. His first
claim to fame as a lawyer, however, apparently followed his attack on the
constitutionality of warrants for papers.
In February 1874, Eaton testified before the House Ways and Means
Committee.239 Eaton laid out the theory the Boyd Court would later adopt,
plus another constitutional argument. Eaton invoked both the Fourth
Amendment and the Due Process Clause of the Fifth.240 He had

231

Id. at 12.
Id. at 16–17.
233
Id. at 17–18.
234
Id. at 17.
235
Id.
236
Id.
237
For a biography of Eaton, see 7 CYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN BIOGRAPHY 130 (1897).
238
Id. On Eaton representing J.P. Morgan as well as Edison, see FORREST MCDONALD,
INSULL: THE RISE AND FALL OF A BILLIONAIRE UTILITY TYCOON 31 (1961).
239
H.R. MISC. DOC. NO. 264, at 68–86 (1874) (testimony before the Committee on Ways
and Means regarding moities and customs-revenue laws). Brainerd testified the same day.
240
Id. at 70 (statement of S.B. Eaton).
232
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considerable authority for both arguments.
Eaton supported his Fourth Amendment argument by an extended
appeal to Entick v. Carrington.241 Eaton, however, also made a due process
argument. Eaton quoted the then-controlling Supreme Court decision in
Murray’s Lessee v. Hoboken Land and Improvement Company.242 The test
of due process under Murray’s Lessee was whether a procedure was known
to the English common law, and Entick had emphatically declared that a
warrant to seize papers was not known to the common law. So in 1874,
Eaton’s reliance on Murray’s Lessee was compelling.
Eaton’s “argument before the congressional committee of ways and
means, for the reform of the customs and revenue laws and the repeal of the
statute authorizing moieties and the seizure of books and papers, attracted
wide attention in the United States.”243 It was also “translated into French
and German [and] was circulated on the continent of Europe.”244 His client,
the New York Chamber of Commerce, reprinted his testimony as a
pamphlet.245 Eaton had written the first draft of Boyd twelve years in
advance.
D. THE 1874 ACT
Two things changed in the twelve years between Eaton’s testimony
and the Boyd decision. First, Congress replaced the 1867 authorization of
warrants to seize books and papers with a quite different procedure.246
Under the new procedure, the district courts lost the authority to issue
warrants to seize books and papers. Instead, in all revenue actions “other
than criminal,” the government could serve a demand on the defendant:
[A]nd if the defendant or claimant shall fail or refuse to produce such book, invoice,
or paper in obedience to such notice, the allegations stated in the said motion shall be
taken as confessed unless his failure or refusal to produce the same shall be explained

241

For Eaton’s argument regarding Entick, see id. at 76.
Id. at 71 (statement of S.B. Eaton) (quoting Murray’s Lessee, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272,
277 (1856)) (“‘We must examine the Constitution itself to see whether this process be in
conflict with any of its provisions. If not found to be so, we must look to those settled
usages and modes of proceeding existing in the common and statute law of England before
the emigration of our ancestors.’”).
243
7 CYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN BIOGRAPHY, supra note 237, at 130.
244
Id.
245
S.B. EATON, A DISCUSSION OF THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE ACT OF CONGRESS OF
MARCH 2, 1867, AUTHORIZING THE SEIZURE OF BOOKS AND PAPERS FOR ALLEGED FRAUDS
UPON THE REVENUE (1874).
246
An Act to Amend the Customs-Revenue Laws and to Repeal Moieties, ch. 391, 18
Stat. 187 (1874).
242
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247

to the satisfaction of the court.

If produced, the documents could be inspected by the government in the
presence of their owner and were admissible in evidence but were not
forfeited.248
No longer could papers be seized on authority of a warrant. On the
other hand, importers who refused to open their books to government
officers would be presumed (practically conclusively) to have violated the
revenue laws.
The statute excepted criminal proceedings but not
proceedings for forfeitures or penalties.
From the government’s standpoint, the new procedure had another
advantage. Judge Clifford’s opinion in Stockwell had held that seized
papers could be used in evidence, notwithstanding the 1868 Act’s bar on
using evidence obtained by any “judicial proceeding” in forfeiture
proceedings and criminal prosecutions.249 There appears to have been at
least some authority for the contrary view, i.e., that papers seized on a
warrant issued under the 1867 Act could not be used in evidence by force of
the 1868 Act.250 So one can read the 1874 disclose-or-confess procedure as
a concession to Eaton’s constitutional arguments, a government escape
hatch from the 1868 exclusionary rule, or both.
The courts soon heard challenges to the constitutionality of the
disclose-or-confess procedure. The early cases all involved forfeiture
proceedings against liquor distilleries, and they all reached the same result
247

Id. § 5, 18 Stat. at 187.
Id.
249
See Stockwell v. United States, 23 F. Cas. 116, 123 (C.C.D. Me. 1870), aff’d, 80 U.S.
531 (1871).
250
See H.R. MISC. DOC. NO. 264, supra note 239, at 73 (statement of S.B. Eaton) (citing
Bingham v. Jordan, Marsh & Co.) (“In the United States court of Massachusetts, in a recent
case of great general interest, it was held by Judge Lowell, that, in view of the existence of
this prohibitory statute, it was ‘difficult to understand’ how the inspection of books and
papers is to be availed by the Government for any useful purpose, since this act provides that
no evidence thus obtained shall be used for any penalty, or in any criminal action; that any
evidence thus obtained might be used to collect duties, or be used by the collector in his
future dealings with the same party or others; but that it is no part of the law to seize books
and papers for the benefit of the collector, in the administration of his duties as collector.”).
Eaton gave no citation for Bingham but may have been referring to In re Jordan, 13 F. Cas.
1077 (D. Mass. 1873) (holding that revenue agents responsible for examining books and
papers described in warrant could not assist marshal in separating papers described in
warrant from other documents). The reported opinion does not include the “difficult to
understand” language, so it seems more likely either that Eaton referred to an opinion in the
same matter that went unreported or that the official report omits Judge Lowell’s remark
about the new exclusionary rule. Eaton went on to say that the 1868 exclusionary rule was
inadequate because the government could seize papers and then introduce other evidence
derived from them. H.R. MISC. DOC. NO. 264, supra note 239, at 74.
248
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by very similar reasoning.251 The distilleries’ Fourth Amendment claims
were rejected on the theory that distillers consent to the government’s rules
when they enter that closely regulated trade—an early version of the
modern “administrative search” doctrine. The Fifth Amendment claims
were rejected by characterizing in rem forfeiture proceedings as civil rather
than criminal cases.
The second important legal development that occurred between
Eaton’s testimony in 1874 and the Boyd decision in 1886 was the Supreme
Court’s retreat from the rigid historical test of due process. In Hurtado v.
California, the Court rejected a Fourteenth Amendment due process
challenge to felony prosecutions initiated by information filed by a
prosecutor as opposed to an indictment returned by a grand jury.252 The
common law did not permit felony informations, so Hurtado had a strong
claim under the historical test of Murray’s Lessee.
Hurtado equated the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause
with its Fifth Amendment predecessor, but then recharacterized the
historical test as permitting any procedure known to the common law rather
than forbidding any procedure not known to the common law.253 The
negative version of the historical test would “deny every quality of the law
but its age, and . . . render it incapable of progress or improvement. It
would be to stamp upon our jurisprudence the unchangeableness attributed
to the laws of the Medes and Persians.”254
Hurtado asserted limits beyond which legislatures could not go, but
described those limits in normative rather than historical terms:
[Due process] refers to that law of the land in each State which derives its authority
from the inherent and reserved powers of the State, exerted within the limits of those
fundamental principles of liberty and justice which lie at the base of all our civil and
political institutions, and the greatest security for which resides in the right of the
255
people to make their own laws, and alter them at their pleasure.

This natural law interpretation (substantive due process, we would call it
today) allowed the Court to balance liberty against the police power.
Eaton’s due process argument against warrants for business records might
still prevail if a majority of the Court concluded that such warrants were
251

See United States v. Three Tons of Coal, 28 F. Cas. 149 (E.D. Wis. 1875); United
States v. Mason, 26 F. Cas. 1189 (N.D. Ill. 1875); United States v. Distillery No. 28, 25 F.
Cas. 868 (D. Ind. 1875).
252
110 U.S. 516, 538 (1884).
253
Id. at 534.
254
Id. at 529.
255
Id. at 535.
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“contrary” to “fundamental principles.”256 But it might also lose under the
amorphous new test. After Hurtado, the clean kill-shot set up by the
juxtaposition of Murray’s Lessee and Entick v. Carrington was gone.
E. BOYD
Why did the issue take so long to reach the Supreme Court? Stockwell
did reach the Court, but only on other issues. We don’t know how often the
government resorted to the formal disclose-or-confess procedure, or how
often individuals cooperated “voluntarily” with official requests for records.
We can imagine, however, the obstacles to litigating the issue posed by the
lower court rulings of 1875, and realize in the process both how unusual the
facts of Boyd actually were and how intertwined the various propositions in
the final opinion turn out to be.
The lower court cases upholding the disclose-or-confess procedure had
rejected Fourth Amendment claims either because the taxpayer consented to
reasonable regulations by entering a business like the liquor trade,257 or
because the disclose-or-confess procedure involved no physical trespass.258
They rejected the Fifth Amendment claim either because tax proceedings
were civil259 or because the procedure did not make any use of the suspect’s
testimony.260
Boyd was factually quite distinctive.261 The government needed glass
on an emergency basis, and the Boyds sold the government glass from stock
256

H.R. MISC. DOC. NO. 264, supra note 239, at 76, 79; see also Hurtado, 110 U.S. at

535.
257

See United States v. Distillery No. 28, 25 F. Cas. 868, 870 (D. Ind. 1875) (“No one
can engage in the manufacture and sale of spirits without the consent of the government.
That consent is obtained on certain terms and conditions.”).
258
See United States v. Three Tons of Coal, 28 F. Cas. 149, 158 (E.D. Wis. 1875) (“The
cases are not like those condemned by the courts of England where general warrants
empowered the officers to enter any private house, and intrude upon the privacy of any
citizen and seize private papers or property for purposes of personal prosecution on any
charge the crown might choose to make.”).
259
See Distillery No. 28, 25 F. Cas. at 869 (“This proceeding is entirely independent of
any criminal prosecutions which have been commenced or which may hereafter be
commenced against them.”).
260
See United States v. Hughes, 26 F. Cas. 417, 419 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1875) (holding that
business records seized by warrant issued under the 1867 Act were not “evidence [ ]obtained
from the party” and therefore were not excluded from evidence by the 1868 Act). The issue
was statutory, but the court’s reasoning applied to any potential Fifth Amendment claims as
well: the defendant “has been perfectly silent. He has disclosed nothing. He has discovered
nothing.” Id.
261
For the lower court proceedings, see United States v. Boyd, 24 F. 690 (S.D.N.Y.
1885) (the civil forfeiture case) and United States v. Boyd, 24 F. 692 (S.D.N.Y. 1885) (the
criminal case).
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on which the duty had been paid in exchange for permission to import a
replacement quantity duty-free.262 They allegedly brought in more glass
duty-free than they had supplied to the government in the first place.263
So, to begin with, there was nothing especially sinister about glass.
Liquor was a dangerous, traditionally regulated commodity that could be
prohibited altogether in the exercise of the police power. Glass was a
quotidian object of lawful commerce. Saying those trading in glass
voluntarily shouldered whatever rules the government wanted to make
about glass would have permitted the liquor exception to swallow the
general rule against unreasonable searches.
Second, while revenue violations typically were potentially criminal,
actual criminal prosecutions were not the norm. The Boyd brothers not
only lost the action for debt; they were indicted criminally and convicted.
Whether the invoice disclosed in response to the disclose-or-confess notice
was used in the criminal trial is not clear from the report. The Supreme
Court’s ruling reversed both the civil and the criminal judgments,264
suggesting that the invoice was used in the criminal trial. Even if it were
not, the potential for self-incrimination in a case where the taxpayers were
prosecuted criminally was much more salient than in the run-of-the-mine
cases of forfeitures or penalties.
Third, the Boyds had neither voluntarily surrendered the invoice nor
withheld it to suffer the statutory inference of guilt. They had surrendered
it under constitutional protest and raised, albeit in a clumsy way, the
constitutional issue before the Supreme Court.265
262

The gist of the criminal accusation was as follows: The defendants were indicted
under § 12 of the Act of June 22, 1874, for the fraudulent entry of thirty-five cases of
imported plate-glass as free, by means of a false and fraudulent letter. See Boyd, 24 F. at
693–94. The government had previously procured from the defendants a large quantity of
their own plate-glass—for immediate use in the construction of the United States courthouse
and post-office building in Philadelphia—at a discount from the domestic price equal to the
rate of duties, under an agreement with the defendants that they might import, free of duty,
new glass in the same amount to replace that furnished to the government. See id. at 694.
The proofs tended to show that under this arrangement the defendants had previously
imported, and entered free of duty, a much larger quantity of glass than sufficient to replace
what they had thus supplied to the government. See id.
263
Id.
264
This is not clear from the Supreme Court opinion, but the West system shows the
criminal conviction reversed by the Supreme Court opinion.
265
See Brief of the Plaintiff in Error at 22–24, Boyd v. United States, in 8 LANDMARK
BRIEFS AND ARGUMENTS OF THE SUPREME COURT 479, 501–03 (1975) [hereinafter Brief].
Most of the brief is devoted to technical issues of forfeiture law and jury instructions. The
constitutional issue is not even listed in the assignments of error, Brief at 4–5, and instead is
mentioned as an afterthought. The brief states apologetically, “Time does not permit us to
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Fourth, the disputed invoice was for twenty-nine cases of glass legally
imported. It was not contraband or the instrumentality of any fraud. Its
sole value to the government was to show that the duty-free letter for the
thirty-five cases imported later was obtained by fraud.
So Boyd’s various propositions are all important to the result. Only if
(1) the Fourth and Fifth Amendments are to be liberally construed could the
Court say that the Boyds had been searched or, in the forfeiture proceeding,
incriminated.266 Only if (2) warrants for papers were unreasonable per se
would the adversary process afforded the Boyds fail to satisfy the Fourth
Amendment. Even granting that (3) the threat of adverse inference
inducing the discovery of the invoice was tantamount to unconstitutional
search and seizure, the usual rule, exemplified by Dana, was that illegal
procurement would not block admission of evidence. So (4) the use of a
lawful document against its owner had to be characterized as compelled
self-incrimination before the Boyds could win.
F. BOYD AND LOCHNER
Akhil Amar,267 Morgan Cloud,268 and the late Bill Stuntz269 have, in
elaborate, as we wish, the propositions hinted at in the foregoing observations. Id. We shall
endeavor to do so orally, citing” inter alia, Entick and Murray’s Lessee. Id. Really
competent counsel would not have relied on Murray’s Lessee two years after Hurtado, at
least not without a fuller discussion. But Murray’s Lessee and Entick feature prominently in
Eaton’s attack on the statute. The brief is what one would expect if someone at the last
minute favored Boyd’s lawyers, Edwin B. Smith and Stephen G. Clarke, with a copy of
Eaton’s pamphlet.
266
See 7 CHARLES FAIRMAN, RECONSTRUCTION AND REUNION, 1864–88, at 740 (1987)
(“Justice Bradley had displayed a determination to give the Amendments a large meaning,
without concern for the literal texts.”).
267
Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV. 757, 788
(1994) (“[T]he spirit inspiring Boyd and its progeny was indeed akin to Lochner’s spirit: a
person has a right to his property, and it is unreasonable to use his property against him in a
criminal proceeding.”).
268
Morgan Cloud, The Fourth Amendment During the Lochner Era: Privacy, Property,
and Liberty in Constitutional Theory, 48 STAN. L. REV. 555, 576 (1996) (citing Amar, supra
note 267) (“The Court’s opinion exemplified both the style of formalist reasoning and the
exaltation of property rights for which the Lochner opinion has been vilified.”). Cloud
equivocates on the ultimate merits of Boyd in a way Amar does not, but nonetheless sees
Boyd and Lochner as cut from the same cloth.
269
William J. Stuntz, The Substantive Origins of Criminal Procedure, 105 YALE L.J.
393, 428 (1995) (“Indeed, it may be fair to say that at about the time of Lochner v. New
York, Fourth and Fifth Amendment law posed a greater threat to activist government, at least
at the federal level, than did substantive due process.”). Stuntz is not unsympathetic to Boyd
on formal doctrinal grounds. See id. (formal arguments for Boyd “looked right”). Yet Stuntz
may be in another way Boyd’s harshest critic, describing Boyd as the centerpiece of a
constitutional regime designed to shield business from humane social regulation.
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somewhat different ways, linked Boyd with the notorious substantive due
process decision Lochner v. New York.270
Some of the evidence adduced so far indeed supports the Boyd-asLochner story. The real brief for the Boyds was written by a brilliant
lawyer representing the New York Chamber of Commerce in testimony
before Congress. The Boyd opinion tracks Eaton’s arguments very closely.
Boyd, clearly, had the effect of complicating federal regulation of business.
Yet that story is at most only partially true. If the Justices were really
interested in protecting business from regulation, they would have
reaffirmed the historical test of due process in Hurtado. Before 1937, the
limited federal jurisdiction over commerce made the states the most
important source of social welfare legislation. If Murray’s Lessee had
remained the law, Entick would have been fastened to the states as well as
to the federal government.
Instead, both before and after Boyd the Court applied a flexible test of
substantive due process to state social-welfare regulations. Prior to
Lochner, the leading cases were Munn v. Illinois271 and Holden v. Hardy.272
Munn rejected a due process challenge to the Illinois “Granger Law” that
limited what farmers could be charged by the owners of grain elevators.273
Holden rejected a due process challenge to a Utah law limiting the hours
that miners could work.274 Notably, Justice Bradley, the author of Boyd,
dissented from the Court’s 1890 decision requiring quasi-judicial hearings
in state rate-making procedures.275 His dissent, relying on Munn, is not an
opinion one would expect from anyone inclined to read laissez-faire
economics into the Constitution.
After Boyd, the Court refused to apply either the Fourth Amendment
or the Fifth Amendment Self-Incrimination Clause to the states,276 where
the real threats to business interests then lay. The post-Boyd federal cases
upheld the constitutionality of transactional immunity against Fifth
Amendment challenge277 and denied corporations the privilege against self270

185 U.S. 45 (1905).
94 U.S. 113 (1876).
272
169 U.S. 366 (1898).
273
Munn, 94 U.S. at 134.
274
Holden, 169 U.S. at 367.
275
134 U.S. 418 (1890).
276
Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 398 (1914) (holding that the Fourth
Amendment does not apply to states); Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78 (1908) (holding
that the Fifth Amendment privilege does not apply to states).
277
Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591 (1896). For the plausibility of the claim that even
271
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incrimination.278 But one year after Lochner, the Court retreated from Boyd
by holding that the Fourth Amendment’s ban on warrants for papers did not
extend to subpoenas.279
There is one more reason to be skeptical of the conventional critique of
Boyd as Lochner: Louis Brandeis. The most eminent progressive jurist in
American history celebrated Boyd as a great landmark of civil liberty in his
famous dissent in Olmstead v. United States.280 If Boyd were cut from the
same cloth as Lochner, Brandeis’s Olmstead opinion would be utterly
inexplicable.
G. BOYD AS DOCTRINE: TWO APPARENT ANOMALIES
The evidence presented in this Article indicates rather strongly that the
Founders regarded papers as deserving greater protection than other effects.
Two strands in the doctrine that emerged under Boyd might cast doubt on
the preference for papers. One is the Supreme Court’s extension of the
immunity enjoyed by papers to innocent, non-forfeitable chattels other than
documents—the mere-evidence rule. The second is the search-incident-toarrest doctrine, which allowed the seizure of papers from the person of a
suspect when lawfully taken into custody. Let us consider these potential
counterexamples in turn.
1. The Mere-Evidence Rule
Papers and other effects could be put on the same plane in two ways.
Modern cases like Burgess reduce papers to the protections for ordinary
effects.281 But nondocumentary chattels might also be elevated to the status
of papers. That is what the Supreme Court did in the 1920s. In Gouled v.
United States282 the government had obtained papers relevant to show fraud
and bribery, some by an undercover agent’s surreptitious theft and some by
warrant naming specific documents to be seized. The Court, answering
questions certified by the Court of Appeals, stated:
There is no special sanctity in papers, as distinguished from other forms of property,
to render them immune from search and seizure, if only they fall within the scope of

transactional immunity is inconsistent with the Fifth Amendment, see id. at 610 (Shiras, J.,
dissenting).
278
Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 69–70 (1906).
279
Id. at 75–76.
280
See Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 474 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)
(characterizing Boyd as “a case that will be remembered as long as civil liberty lives in the
United States”).
281
See United States v. Burgess, 576 F.3d 1078 (10th Cir. 2009).
282
255 U.S. 298 (1921).
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the principles of the cases in which other property may be seized, and if they be
adequately described in the affidavit and warrant. Stolen or forged papers have been
so seized . . . , and we cannot doubt that contracts may be so used as instruments or
agencies for perpetrating frauds upon the Government as to give the public an interest
in them which would justify the search for and seizure of them, under a properly
283
issued search warrant, for the purpose of preventing further frauds.

To say that papers used to commit crimes are forfeitable and may be seized
is not tantamount to saying that other chattels may not be seized unless they
are forfeitable.
I have a speculative but plausible explanation for the mere-evidence
rule’s elevation of other chattels to the status of papers under Boyd.
Discouraging law enforcement excesses in the investigation of possessory
offenses required extending the Boyd rule not just to chattels other than
documents, but indeed to contraband chattels like Prohibition-era liquor.
The latter move was utterly contrary to the logic of Entick and Boyd, but the
Court made the move just four years after Gouled.284 If we assume that the
Justices were concerned about deterring abuses in the enforcement of
Prohibition, Gouled, heterodox and ahistorical as it was, is explicable as the
necessary stepping-stone to the suppression of illegal chattels like
moonshine and cocaine. Given the modern exclusionary rule’s explicit
basis in deterrence of Fourth Amendment violations, today there is no
pragmatic reason to give other chattels the same protection as “papers.”
2. Search Incident to Arrest
Papers can be equated with other “effects” by permitting the seizure of
papers, rather than by barring the seizure of chattels. We have seen that
until the 1863 revenue measure, there had been an unbroken pattern of
exempting documents from seizure under warrant. Yet the search of
persons upon arrest was a familiar Founding-era practice,285 and in the

283

Id. at 309 (citations omitted).
Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20, 36 (1925) (holding that illegally seized cocaine
could not be used in evidence against victim of warrantless home invasion). The
government argued that Agnello had waived his objection to the evidence by not filing a
motion for return of property, then excused the defense from making a motion that, if
granted, would have gotten the defendant rearrested on the courthouse steps. See id. at 34.
The truly bizarre reasoning was that the pretrial motion was required only to avoid inquiry
into collateral facts during trial. Since, in the instant case, the government conceded there
was no warrant to enter, the Agnello Court said the trial court should have sustained the
evidentiary objection during trial. Id. at 35. The unanimous Court, understandably, said
nothing about what was to be done with the cocaine after trial.
285
See TELFORD TAYLOR, TWO STUDIES IN CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 28 (1960)
(finding “little reason to doubt that search of an arrestee’s person and premises is as old as
284
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course of searching the prisoner, documents might well be discovered.
Search of the person arrested seems to have been so standard as to escape
legal challenge until late in the nineteenth century.286
After Boyd the collision of the search-incident power with the ban on
seizing papers was inevitable. The New York Court of Appeals, per that
familiar apologist for blundering constables, Benjamin Cardozo, took the
position that the search-incident power trumped the private-papers rule so
that even documents not subject to forfeiture as contraband or
instrumentalities could be seized from the person arrested.287 This seems
unsound, because it permitted the police to go further without warrant than
a judge could go by issuing one.
Learned Hand delivered the true exposition of Entick and Boyd in the
search-incident context.288 Beautifully penetrating the pooling problem,
Hand articulated what might be called the “anti-rummaging” principle:
After arresting a man in his house, to rummage at will among his papers in search of
whatever will convict him, appears to us to be indistinguishable from what might be
done under a general warrant; indeed, the warrant would give more protection, for
presumably it must be issued by a magistrate. True, by hypothesis the power would
not exist, if the supposed offender were not found on the premises; but it is small
consolation to know that one’s papers are safe only so long as one is not at home.
Such constitutional limitations arise from grievances, real or fancied, which their
makers have suffered, and should go pari passu with the supposed evil. They
289
withstand the winds of logic by the depth and toughness of their roots in the past.

Documents, Hand declared, could only be seized when they were
forfeitable (“[t]he forged note, the fraudulent prospectus”).290 But even
the institution of arrest itself”).
286
There is no discussion of search powers during arrest in Blackstone or in any JP
manual I have seen. Stephen, writing in 1883, treats arrest extensively without mentioning
search. 1 JAMES FITZJAMES STEPHEN, HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND 190–94
(1883).
287
People v. Chiagles, 237 N.Y. 193, 197–98 (1923) (upholding use as evidence of
letters taken from defendant on arrest).
Conceding the legality of the arrest, [defendant] concedes by implication the legality of the
search. What he complains of is not the search but the seizure that succeeded it. The search, we
are told, may lawfully be made, but what is found must be returned, though it be proof positive
of guilt, unless at the same time it is an implement of felony. This is to carry the immunity
beyond the bounds of reason.

Id.
288

See United States v. Kirschenblatt, 16 F.2d 202 (2d Cir. 1926).
Id. at 203.
290
Id. at 204. On this point the difference with Cardozo is theoretically important but
practically minute, because it “is seldom that one finds a document containing evidence of
crime which was not at one time used in its commission; the papers important in any
prosecution are ordinarily either communications passing between the actors or records
289
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when the object of the search was forfeitable, the police had no more
constitutional power upon arrest than a judge issuing a warrant to comb
through a vast trove of innocent papers in quest of an illegal one. The
Supreme Court subsequently endorsed Hand’s view, albeit temporarily.291
V. SUMMING UP: HISTORY AS OPPORTUNITY
A. THE CASE AGAINST EQUATING “PAPERS” AND “EFFECTS”
If Boyd cannot be written off as the product of a vast right-wing
conspiracy, it does not automatically follow that Boyd was right. The
warrant at issue in Entick was both a sweeping warrant and a warrant for
papers. Entick says the latter is a distinct and grievous legal wrong.
Wigmore refused to take that feature of the opinion at face value. The real
issue about Boyd’s legitimacy is whether a specific warrant to seize as
evidence papers lawfully possessed is or is not constitutionally
“unreasonable.” According to Wigmore, Boyd “mistreats the Fourth
Amendment, in applying its prohibition to a returnable writ of seizure
describing specific documents in the possession of a specific person.”292
Others, including Justice Holmes293 and, more recently, Professor Davies,294
have shared Wigmore’s view.
The Boyd majority should not be dismissed too lightly. For one thing,
the opinion was written less than a century after the ratification of the
Fourth Amendment. The Justices had walked the earth with the Founding
necessary to keep track of the details.” Id.
291
Compare Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192, 192 (1927) (upholding admission of
ledger kept by operator of a speakeasy as an instrumentality in the “immediate possession
and control” of the person arrested), with United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56 (1950)
(upholding search incident to arrest that extended to desk drawers and filing cabinet).
Justice Minton’s majority opinion in Rabinowitz reversed Hand’s opinion below; Justices
Black, Frankfurter, and Jackson dissented. Rabinowitz was subsequently repudiated by
Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
292
4 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, TREATISE ON THE SYSTEM OF EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT
COMMON LAW § 2264 (1904) (footnotes omitted).
293
Holmes did not join Brandeis in Olmstead but dissented on other grounds. See Robert
Post, Federalism, Positivism, and the Emergence of the American Administrative State:
Prohibition in the Taft Era Court, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1, 144 n.476 (2006) (noting in
an internal memo about the Olmstead case, “[a]longside the sentence in which Brandeis
observed that Boyd ‘reviewed the history that lay behind the Fourth and Fifth Amendments,’
Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 474 (Brandeis, J., dissenting), Holmes commented: ‘My impression
was that Wigmore had thrashed the history’ set forth in Boyd”).
294
Thomas Y. Davies, The Supreme Court Giveth and the Supreme Court Taketh Away:
The Century of Supreme Court “Fourth Amendment” Doctrine, 100 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 933, 956 (2010).
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generation.295 If the passage of time makes the original understanding more
difficult to recover, the Boyd court has more than a century’s worth of an
advantage over us.
In the second place, one of the members of the Boyd majority was
Horace Gray, a legal historian who compiled the first archive of primary
sources related to the Writs of Assistance controversy. 296 “Here, in almost
145 pages, packed with footnotes, Gray delivered a magnificent display of
research into the origin and use of search warrants up to and at the time of
Otis’s arguments.”297 That archive remains “essential reading.”298 True,
Gray was not, apparently, an originalist.299 But if Bradley’s opinion had
declared false history we would expect a deep student of the controversy
over the writs, intimate with the grandson of John Adams,300 to have known
it and said something about it.
Scholars such as Cuddihy and Clancy have concluded that the
amendment has the dual meaning suggested by the wording finally adopted:
a general right against unreasonable searches and seizures is declared, and a
specific prohibition against general warrants is superimposed on the general
declaration.301 If we accept the latter interpretation, as the Court has
done,302 the historical record cuts strongly against applying the same criteria
for “papers” as for other “effects.”
First, papers are specially mentioned in the constitutional text, and in
Madison’s proposal and Adams’s Massachusetts provision before. Each
provision, moreover, puts papers where you might expect from a normative
point of view—papers ranked behind persons and houses, but ahead of all
other “effects” or “possessions.”303
295

Justice Bradley was born in 1813. Thomas Jefferson and John Adams famously
expired on or about the Fourth of July, 1826. John Marshall lived until 1835.
296
Horace Gray, Notes, in JOSIAH QUINCY, JR., REPORTS OF CASES ARGUED AND
ADJUDGED IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF JUDICATURE OF THE PROVINCE OF MASSACHUSETTS
BAY BETWEEN 1761 AND 1772, at 395 (1865).
297
Robert M. Spector, Historian on the Supreme Court: Justice Horace C. Gray, Jr. and
the Historical Method, 12 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 181, 194 (1968).
298
Thomas K. Clancy, The Role of History, 7 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 811, 812 (2010) (book
review).
299
Spector, supra note 297, at 209 (“Gray viewed the Federal Constitution as a living
organism that meant one thing in 1789, another in 1860, and still another in his own time.”).
300
Id. Charles Francis Adams spent “many years of friendship” with Gray, although it
appears that Adams thought Gray an unimaginative judge. Id.
301
See THOMAS K. CLANCY, THE FOURTH AMENDMENT 10–11 (2008); CUDDIHY, supra
note 66, at 765–82.
302
Countless cases have held warrantless searches “unreasonable.” See, e.g., Bond v.
United States, 529 U.S. 334 (2000).
303
Akhil Reed Amar, America’s Lived Constitution, 120 YALE L.J. 1734, 1772 n.89
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Wigmore’s point that the Amendment permits reasonable searches for
papers and therefore excludes Boyd’s per se ban is unpersuasive. For one
thing, even under the rigid rule of Boyd it was “reasonable” to seize stolen
papers, obscene books, and criminal libels. Second, if the Declaratory
Clause is read to say that not all “searches and seizures” of “papers” are
“unreasonable,” the Warrant Clause can equally be said to permit no
warrant to search or seize “papers” because the Warrant Clause refers to
places to be searched and persons or things to be seized. “Things”
correlates to “effects” in the Declaratory Clause, so that the distinction
between “papers” and “things” implies that while “things” might be seized
on a warrant, “papers” could not be.
Proponents of treating “papers” the same as other “effects” face a
serious challenge in the constitutional text. If “papers” are entitled to no
higher protection than other “effects” (or “possessions” in some of the state
provisions), why does the text mention “papers” at all? If it was an
accident, why did the Massachusetts, New Hamphsire, Pennsylvania, and
Vermont constitutions also refer specially to “papers”? Coupling the text
with the seizure-of-papers controversy gives a very good reason for what
would otherwise be inexplicable.
Second, American courts recognized Entick as part of the received
body of English common law. A statute might trump the common law, but
the Fourth Amendment trumps a statute. Justice Story wrote that the Fourth
Amendment is “little more than the affirmance of a great constitutional
doctrine of the common law.”304 If the Fourth Amendment incorporated the
common law, even a common law subject to reasoned statutory and judicial
development, the Fourth Amendment’s Declaratory Clause prohibits
equating “papers” and “effects.”
Third, at the heart of Whig opposition to seizing papers was the belief
that any search of papers, even for a specific criminal item, was a general
search. It followed that any warrant to sift through documents is a general
warrant, even if it is specific to the location of the trove and the item to be
seized. American patriots were familiar with the general warrants
controversy in England, quite independently of any published law reports.
They were in sympathy, in particular, with Father of Candor’s Letter
Concerning Libels. Every Whig pamphlet I have seen describes seizing
papers as an abuse distinct from, but intrinsically resembling, in aggravated
form, general warrants. The House of Commons, in linked resolutions,
(2011) (“[T]he Fourth Amendment singled out ‘papers’ for special protections above and
beyond all other stuff—‘effects.’”).
304
3 STORY, supra note 7, § 1895, at 748.
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condemned general warrants and seizures of papers.
Fourth, the earliest statutory provision authorizing search warrants for
books and papers I have found is the 1859 Massachusetts act promptly
declared unconstitutional in Robinson. The Congress that adopted the
Sedition Act did not go so far; nor did the 1780 Pennsylvania legislature
whose initial proposal was criticized by Zuinglius. It might be said that the
Entick rule was limited in English law to libel cases, because the resolutions
in the Commons were narrowly worded to gain reluctant supporters. Father
of Candor expressly rejected limiting the prohibition of general warrants to
libel cases,305 and endorsed Candor’s earlier words about “the absolute
illegality of the seizure of papers.”306 I have seen no American authority
limiting the prohibition of general warrants, or the ban on seizing papers, to
libel cases; Zuinglius in 1780 admits no such limitation. The constitutional
text suggests no such distinction. Some sources suggest an exception for
national security cases.307 This exception, however, would not have been
necessary if Entick were limited to libel prosecutions.
The positive law has closed its eyes on history. Federal Rule of
Criminal Procedure 41 flatly equates “documents, books, papers, any other
tangible objects, and information.”308 The rule plainly contemplates “the
seizure of electronic storage media” for “later off-site copying or
review.”309 Today, federal agents may obtain warrants to seize and carry
away entire troves of digitally stored private papers and peruse those files at
remote locations, one by one. What the leading Whig polemicist
denounced as an “abominable outrage,” what the common law condemned
as a relic of the Star Chamber, and what no American legislature authorized
for the first eighty years of Independence, has become standard law
enforcement procedure.
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FATHER OF CANDOR, supra note 108, at 50.
Id. at 54.
307
CANDOR, supra note 107, at 33 (“Now, in the case of High Treason, so dangerous to
the being of the whole state, it may not, perhaps, at particular junctures, be improper to
support, or indemnify at least, even Secretaries of State in the seizure of papers, and of every
thing else, however illegal, that may possible serve to a discovery and conviction of the
Traitor.”); Zuinglius, supra note 145 (“In cases where by defection to the enemy, as lately in
the case of Arnold, or where by taking up arms, or by other means, the treason is notorious,
the seizure of papers is justifiable by reason, and is warranted by law already existing.”).
Whigs did not uniformly admit a treason exception. Cf. Glynn’s argument in Entick v.
Carrington, (1765) 2 Wils. 275, 285 (K.B.).
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FED. R. CRIM. P. 41.
309
Id.
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B. THE POOLING PROBLEM AND THE ALL-OR-NOTHING
DILEMMA
To say that the Fourth Amendment calls for special treatment of
private documents does not answer the question of just what that special
treatment should be. Current doctrine seems premised on a supposed
dilemma. If private documents do not enjoy heightened constitutional
status, and the government can show probable cause to believe that one
document among thousands is either contraband or evidence, the police
may scan the entire lot. In some cases their suspicions will prove baseless
and they will have searched thousands of innocent but private entries for no
good purpose. If, on the other hand, documents do deserve heightened
constitutional protection, the government has no right to pick through the
haystack in search of the needle, and documentary evidence of serious
crimes would, as a practical matter, become off-limits to law enforcement.
The scale of the pooling problem has changed dramatically between the
asportation of all of Wilkes’s papers in a sack to the perusal of all the files
on Burgess’s hard drive. The structure of the problem has not.
The pooling problem is not about either the lawfulness of the object of
search or the particularity of a warrant. In the 1760s, libels could at least
theoretically be seized; the problem was the need to look through reams of
innocent private papers to find the contraband ones.310 Under today’s
criminal law, a meth recipe would be an instrumentality of crime and
subject to seizure even under Boyd. A warrant to search the suspect’s
computer might be scrupulously limited to searching for “documents
containing any formula for synthesizing methamphetamine.” Because
gangsters are unlikely to label their working files with obvious markers of
criminality, the problem is the sheer volume of innocent files that must be
scanned if the criminal material is to be found (or conclusively found
absent).
Burgess saw the dilemma as intractable and chose unrestrained police
power as the lesser evil. Only ten years after the failure to search Zacarias
Moussaoui’s computer cost a chance to prevent the 9/11 attacks and all the
horrors that have followed, the Burgess Court’s position is probably
inevitable, if the supposed dilemma is really irreducible. Even if Boyd
offers the most plausible historical reading of private papers under the
Fourth Amendment, there is zero practical prospect of a return to a per se
ban on seizing private papers (especially if, as seems likely, this would
logically entail a similar per se prohibition on nonconsensual electronic
310

On Chief Justice Pratt’s equivocations about seizing even libelous papers, see supra
text accompanying notes 91–96.
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surveillance).
What, however, if the dilemma is false? What if heightened but not
absolute protections for private documents—like those proposed by Chief
Judge Kozinski or contained in the British legislation—had legitimate roots
in text and history? We have taken similar approaches to at least some
highly intrusive search-and-seizure practices. Wiretap orders by statute are
considerably more demanding than ordinary search warrants, and their
execution is subject to a duty to minimize interception of innocent
conversations.311 The Court has held that a court order based on probable
cause is not enough to make compelled surgery to recover a bullet
“reasonable.”312 Probable cause and an exigent circumstance alone are not
enough to justify arrest by gunshot.313 Some middle ground might be
legitimate as well as sensible.
C. BEYOND ALL OR NOTHING
The seizures of Entick’s and Wilkes’s papers were indiscriminate,
expropriating, unregulated, and inquisitorial. These same objections were
raised, with considerable justice, against the 1863 customs statute. The
revised statute that came before the Court in Boyd attempted an ingenious
solution to the pooling problem, i.e., the sorting of the pool by the suspects
themselves. As Justice Miller pointed out at the time, and Richard
Nagareda argued a century later, the Court could have dealt with the statute
before it solely on Fifth Amendment grounds.314
The Boyd majority seemed eager to strike down the 1863 statute,
which was no longer in force. The majority never really grappled with
whether the disclose-or-admit procedure was in any pertinent way similar to
the warrants in Wilkes and Entick. Eaton had swung for the fences, for all
or nothing, and won his wager.
One wonders how the Boyd majority would have ruled if Congress had
adopted the reforms proposed by Eaton’s colleague Cephas Brainerd rather
than the disclose-or-confess arrangement.
Brainerd proposed a
particularized warrant, and permitted only a judicially supervised seizure
for inspection and copying, limited at most to twelve days, with a right to
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18 U.S.C. § 2518 (2006).
Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 765 (1995).
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Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (1985).
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See Richard A. Nagareda, Compulsion “To Be a Witness” and the Resurrection of
Boyd, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1575 (1999). Nagareda supposed that Boyd was wrong on Fourth
Amendment grounds and private papers could be seized on a warrant. The evidence
assembled here, and by Professor Schnapper earlier, indicates at the very least that Boyd’s
private-papers holding was not implausible.
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attend the inspection personally and through counsel, and to preserve
exculpatory evidence for trial.315 These reforms would have made warrant
practice discriminate, minimally rivalrous, and closely regulated. Brainerd
offered them as permissible under a “liberal construction” of the Fourth
Amendment “in favor of the government.”
Eaton would surely have maintained his Fourth Amendment objection
to any warrant to seize papers for use as evidence. Today that argument is
academic, in the pejorative sense. The contemporary Supreme Court,
repelled by the practical consequences of making papers inviolate, has all
but abandoned Boyd. As things stand, some protection for personal
documents would move the law closer to the original understanding and
strike a better normative balance between personal privacy and public
security in a digital age.
There is, moreover, a powerful argument that the original
understanding did permit narrow, brief, and regulated seizures of papers.
Search upon arrest was a familiar feature of Founding-era practice, and was
not challenged on Fourth Amendment grounds until after Boyd. I have no
specific instance of Founding-era seizures of papers incident to arrest, but
likewise there is no known instance of a court holding the seizure of papers
from an arrested person to be unconstitutional.
Judge Hand’s anti-rummaging principle offers a principled resolution
for how to respect the special value of private documents without
precluding their seizure altogether. In Hand’s account, all of the arrested
person’s papers could be seized, and then inspected. The government then
had the right to retain for trial any that qualified as fruits, contraband, or
instrumentalities. Hand saw a world of difference between seizing papers
from the immediate control of a person under arrest and searching a
houseful of private papers.
That distinction has normative appeal. Even when the government has
probable cause to believe a criminal document can be found in a pool of
innocent documents, at some point the exposure of innocent information
becomes a greater evil than the loss of evidence. A better-than-even chance
that a drug transaction or a lewd image of a child can be found in a desk
drawer is very different than a better-than-even chance that the same items
can be found in one of a million desk drawers.
Hand limited the search for papers to the immediate area of the
arrested person, thus placing a sharp practical limit on the scope of the
seizure. Any seizure of papers was to be brief and regulated, because the
officer was bound to bring the suspect promptly before a magistrate. And it
315

See BRAINERD, supra note 228, at 16–18.
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was to be minimally intrusive; the suspect could make little use of papers
while in handcuffs or in jail, and as soon as he was released from custody
he could obtain the return of any innocent papers taken.
Prior to the advent of digital technology, Hand’s anti-rummaging norm
offered a characteristically principled adjudication of the tension between
Founding-era respect for papers and Founding-era acceptance of search
powers implied by lawful arrest. Today the arrested person is likely to
carry a cell phone, tablet, or flash drive on the person that can store more
pages of text than Jack Wilkes read in his lifetime, let alone the lot that was
carried off in a sack. In today’s technological environment, the antirummaging principle Hand logically derived from Entick would not
countenance either the search of thousands of files incident to arrest, or
even pursuant to a search warrant for criminal files that might—and might
not—be among the thousands of files to be scanned. At least the principle
would not countenance such searches without limiting procedures of the
sort proposed by Chief Judge Kozinski.
The anti-rummaging principle, then, suggests curtailing the warrantless
seizure and search of digital devices incident to arrest. And it suggests that
Chief Judge Kozinski’s opinion in Comprehensive Drug Testing is not, as
Judge Callahan argued, without “legal authority.” On the contrary, that
basic approach is supported by our highest legal authority, the text of the
Constitution in historical context.316
There are difficult questions about both the substance of structural
safeguards on digital searches, and about the institutions best equipped to
formulate those safeguards. All I have suggested here is that safeguards
that greatly reduce the special evils that attended the seizures of papers in
the 1760s might make digital-age Fourth Amendment law simultaneously
more legitimate and more functional. If that turns out to be true, the time
may come when structuring digital searches is not just best practice, but
also the only practice that is not “unreasonable.”
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Compare United States v. Comprehensive Drug Testing, 621 F.3d 1162, 1179 (9th
Cir. 2010) (“The warrant application should normally include, or the issuing judicial officer
should insert, a protocol for preventing agents involved in the investigation from examining
or retaining any data other than that for which probable cause is shown.”), with Entick, 19
How. St. Tr. at 1072 (“If libels are to be seized, it ought to be laid down with precision,
when, where, upon what charge, against whom, by what magistrate, and in what stage of the
prosecution.”), and FATHER OF CANDOR, supra note 108, at 58 (“[I]f a positive oath be made,
and such a particular warrant be issued, it can only be executed upon the paper or thing
sworn to and specified, and in the presence of the owner, or somebody intrusted by him, with
the custody of it.”).
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